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WATCHING THE WATCHERS: SURVEILLANCE,
TRANSPARENCY, AND POLITICAL FREEDOM IN THE WAR ON
TERROR
Seth F. Kreimer*
Like other totalitarian movements, the terrorists seek to impose a grim vision
in which dissent is crushed, and every man and woman must think and live
in colorless conformity.'
INTRODUCTION: "TEAR DOWN THE WAALLS"
If one insight apparently transcends the current partisan rancor, it
is that the effort to secure America against terrorist attacks requires
better intelligence. And if one consensus candidate emerges as the
prerequisite for that improvement, it is that the intelligence services
should gather more information and share it more widely. The Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Investigation Inquiry into
September 11 identified the failure to share intelligence as a system-
atic flaw that exposed the United States to terrorist attacks.2 The At-
torney General regularly inveighs against the "impediments to com-
munication and information sharing among the men and women
charged with keeping America safe., 3  The non-partisan Markle
Foundation Task Force has advocated improved sharing of informa-
tion as the precondition to more effective homeland security,4 a rec-
' Kenneth W. Gemmill Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This paper was origi-
nally delivered at the "Homeland Security and Civil Liberties" conference jointly hosted on
June 18, 2004 by the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Army War College. It has
benefited from the comments of the participants at that conference, as well as the perceptive
analysis of M.E. Bowman, Lara Flint, Jonathan Fredman, Mitch Marcus, Kim Scheppele, and
Polk Wagner, and the superb research assistance of Mihir Kshirsigar. They have my deep
thanks, while I retain all responsibility for errors or omissions that remain.
President George W. Bush, Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Graduation
Ceremony (June 2, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/2004
0602.html.
E.g., September 11 Intelligence Failures: Hearing Before thef S. & House Select Intelligence Comm.,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff), http://
www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002-hr/100102hill.pdf.
. E.g., U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks Regarding the Intelligence Sharing
Initiative at the Department of Justice (May 14, 2004) (transcript available from the Federal
News Service at http://www.fnsg.com).
' MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE, CREATING A TRUSTED NETWORK FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 2
(2003) [hereinafter MARKLE REPORT] (stressing the importance of information sharing and
analysis), http://www.markletaskforce.org/Report2-Full-Report.pdf.
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ommendation joined by the Defense Department's Technology and
Privacy Advisory Committee.5 The General Accounting Office simi-
larly reports that "homeland security" requires increased interpreta-
tion of intelligence.6
This urge to share information has generated an efflorescence of
efforts to gather, swap, and agglomerate data. In law enforcement,
the USA PATRIOT Act and Justice Department rule-making have fa-
mously "torn down the walls" separating foreign intelligence and
domestic law enforcement.7 The Justice Department has established
the framework for a National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan
8among state and local law enforcement agencies. The FBI seeks todevelop "a single, integrated information space, in which the default
' TECH. AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE
FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 6 (2004) [hereinafter TAPAC REPORT] ("[W]e believe a uniform
system of laws and technology measures to facilitate data mining and information sharing with-
out compromising the privacy of U.S. persons is essential."), http://www.sainc.com/tapac/
TAPACReport Final_5-10-04.pdf.
6 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-03-760, HOMELAND SECURITY: EFFORTS TO
IMPROVE INFORMATION SHARING NEED TO BE STRENGTHENED 29-31 (2003) ("If [the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security] does not effectively strengthen efforts to improve the information-
sharing process, the nation's ability to detect or prepare for attacks may be undermined."),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03760.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
' U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Preserving Life and Liberty, Prepared Remarks at
the American Enterprise Institute (Aug. 19, 2003) (" [11n the Patriot Act, Congress began to tear
down the walls that cut off communication between intelligence and law enforcement offi-
cials."), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2003/08 1903remarksataeifinal.htm.
' Ted Leventhal, Officials Announce Plan to Share Terrorism Intelligence, May 14, 2004, at
http://govexec.com/dailyfed/0504/051404tdpm1.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2004). See GLOBAL
JUSTICE INFO. SHARING INITIATIVE INTELLIGENCE WORKING GROUP (GIWG), DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING PLAN iii-viii (2004) [hereinafter SHARING PLAN]
(summarizing the report's recommendations), available at http://it.ojp.gov/documents/
NationalCriminal_lntelligenceSharingPlan.pdf; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney
General Asbcroft Announces Implementation of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing
Plan (May 14, 2004) (describing the initiative as designed to link federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies so that they can share intelligence information to prevent terrorism and
crime), http://www.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel04/natlsharing05l404.htm. For more informa-
tion about current sharing initiatives, see the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Web
site at http://it.ojp.gov/global.
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan contains recommendations to incorporate pri-
vacy guidelines developed by the National Criminal Justice Association. SHARING PLAN at vi. See
NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSOC., JUSTICE INFORMATION PRIVACY GUIDELINE (2002),
http://www.ncja.org/pdf/privacyguideline.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2004). The Sharing Plan
also recommends compliance with the privacy protection mandates of 28 C.F.R. § 23 (2003).
One difficulty here is that section 23 embodies a "reasonable suspicion" requirement,
§ 23.20(a), a direct relationship requirement for First Amendment related records, § 23.30(b),
and "need to know" limitations, § 23.20(e), (g). The "protections" of civil liberties which the
Attorney General touts as part of the Sharing Plan thus appear to include exactly the "road-
blocks" he purports to seek to remove. On the other hand, the Sharing Plan suggests that sec-
tion 23 "is currently pending revision" in light of "the speed of which technology changes, the
nature of the new threat to public safety (exemplified by terrorism), and the critical need to
facilitate information sharing among all levels of government." SHARING PLAN at 14.
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will be to share with agencies,"9 while the Justice Department is ex-
perimenting with a "database that will ultimately be accessible to all
participating agencies via secure Internet" linking the databases of
state, local, and federal law enforcement authorities.'0 A federally
funded program based in Florida is trying to link state public records
and private databases into the "Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information
Exchange ("MATRIX").""
On the military side, even after the demise of the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency's ("DARPA") controversial "Total
Information Awareness" ("TIA") program,"2 the Commander of
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REP. No. 04-10, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER INFORMATION
47 (2003) [hereinafter OIG, FBI'S EFFORTS] (stating that the shared information space is one of
the "guiding principles that the FBI expects to apply to its information sharing strategy" in its
draft Integrated Information Sharing Plan), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/audit/FBI/
0410/final.pdf.
"0 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney General John Ashcroft Unveils Gateway Informa-
tion Sharing Pilot Project in St. Louis, Missouri (Oct. 9, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2002/October/02_ag_589.htm.
" The self-definition of MATRIX can be found at the program's Web site at
http://www.matrix-at.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2004). It purports to be "a computerized re-
search tool that electronically queries existing criminal justice records and public and commer-
cial databases." Frequently Asked Questions, MATRIX, at http://www.matrix-at.org/faq.htm
(last visited Sept. 15, 2004). There is evidence, however, that MATRIX has data mining capa-
bilities. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Documents Acquired by ACLU Prove That
MATRIX is a Data Mining Program (Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/.
The program is based in Florida, overseen by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement,
and operated by Sesint, a private firm, which previously generated a list of 120,000 names based
on a "terrorism index" comprised of "such factors as age, gender, ethnicity, credit history, 'in-
vestigational data,' information about pilot and driver licenses, and connections to 'dirty' ad-
dresses known to have been used by other suspects." Brian Bergstein, Database Measured 'Terror-
ism Quotient', MY WAY, May 20, 2004, http://apnews.myway.com/article/20040520/
D82M9B400.html. At this writing, eight of the original thirteen states have withdrawn their co-
operation due to privacy concerns. See Ryan Singel, New York, Wisconsin Unplug Matrix, WIRED
NEWS, Mar. 15, 2004, at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,62645,00.html (last visited
Sept. 17, 2004). There is some indication that federal involvement extends beyond funding.
Robert O'Harrow, Anti-Terror Database Got Show at White House, WASH. POST, May 21, 2004, at
A12 (describing the MATRIX system as "capable of examining records of billions of people in
seconds."). TAPAC reports that the Department of Homeland Security is a full MATRIX par-
ticipant. TAPAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
'2 The TIA project was part of the now-disbanded Information Awareness Office headed by
retired Admiral John Poindexter. See William Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2002, at A35 ("Attorney General Ashcroft tried his Terrorism and Prevention System (TIPS),
but public outrage at the use of gossips and postal workers as snoops caused the house to shut it
down."). The far reaching surveillance project sought to establish a capacity to capture the "in-
formation signature" of subjects so that the government could track potential terrorists and
criminals. See Presolicitation Notice BAA02-08, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) (Mar. 21, 2002) (describing the project and soliciting funding proposals), at
http://www.darpa.mil/baa/baa02-08.htm. The project's ambitious plans called for creating a
"virtual, centralized, grand database" filled with details about the personal lives of all Americans
and non-citizens to enable data mining programs to find patterns and associations that might
help gather intelligence to preempt terrorist acts. Id. The project, with an ominous logo and
Sept. 2004]
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Northcom, General Ralph Eberhart, has avowed that "[w]e need to
change from the 'need to know' Cold War mentality to the 'need to
share,'.. . in this global war on terrorism., 13 A series of initiatives in
the military have sought to gather and integrate information about
potential terrorist activities from both traditional intelligence sources
and "raw non-validated" reports of "anomalous activities." 4 Indeed,
"knowledge is power" as its slogan, attracted a firestorm of criticism from advocacy groups, e.g.,
Letter from Thirty Civil Liberties Groups to Senators Daschle and Lott (Nov. 18, 2002) (oppos-
ing the Total Information Awareness Project), http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/
tialetterl 1.18.02.html, and from technical experts who questioned the feasibility of the system,
e.g., Letter from U.S. Association for Computing Machinery to Senators Warner and Levin (Jan.
23, 2003) (expressing concerns regarding Total Information Awareness System),
http://www.acm.org/usacm/Letters/tia_final.html. Congress reacted by first demanding a
report from the office about the projected impact on civil liberties, see DARPA, REPORT TO
CONGRESS REGARDING TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM IN RESPONSE TO
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS RESOLUTION OF 2003, PUB. L. No. 108-7, 117 STAT. 11, § 111 (B)
(2003), and then subsequently by halting funding for the project. See Conf. Rep. on H.R. 2658,
Department Of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, H.R. Rep. No. 108-283, 108th Cong., at
§ 8131 (A) (2003) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds appropriated
or otherwise made available in this or any other Act may be obligated for the Terrorism Infor-
mation Awareness Program."). Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense initiated a separate review
in February 2003 to assess the civil liberties implications of the system, which resulted in the
TAPAC Report. TAPAC REPORT, supra note 5, at iii. DARPA, however, is not likely to abandon
research in data mining software, and the issues will no doubt resurface, even if not as dramati-
cally as with TIA, since the Pentagon is certainly more sensitive to public perception of its activi-
ties. Id. at 5.
13 Doug Sample, Defending the Homeland Is a 'Must Win' Game, AM. FORCES INFO. SERVICE, Feb.
26, 2004, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/n02262004_200402263.html. This
echoes the Northern Command's Chief Information Officer, who earlier announced that "[m ] y
mantra is that I need to change from a 'need to know' to a 'need to share' foundation." Molly
Peterson, Homeland Defense Commander Stresses 'Need to Share' Information, Dec. 3, 2002, at
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1202/120302tdl.htm. See also William M. Arkin, U.S. Mili-
tary: Mission Creep Hits Home, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at M2 (quoting General Eberhart as
stating that "[w]e are not going to be out there spying on people... [w]e get information from
people who do," and describing the "Counterintelligence Field Activity," which has been given
the mission of data mining public records, credit card accounts, and intercepted communica-
tions); Robert Green, NSA's Wolf Touts Innovation and "Need to Share," EFFECTIVE GOV'T IN
ACTION, Oct. 31, 2003, at http://www.publicsectorinstitute.net/ELetters/EGovernment/vln6/
0097EGvln6NSA.Isp; William New, Computer Firm Helps Military Share its 'Trusted' Data, Jan. 23,
2004 ("[S]ince the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 'need to know' approach to information
has become a 'need to share' philosophy."), at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0104/
0123oftdpm2.htm.
14 Brian McWilliams, DoD Logging Unverified Threats, WIRED NEWS, June 25, 2003, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,59365,00.html. See Larry Kahaner, A Businesslike
Approach to Solving Crime, INFO. WK., Apr. 5, 2004, at G23 (describing Air Force Office of Special
Investigations use of "business-intelligence system" to update information "across several data-
bases"); Lt. Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr. & Mark Powell, Protecting America With Information Technology,
2003 SIGNAL 35 (describing the development of the "Protect America System" which joins the
databases of Northcom, the U.S. Customs Service, the Secret Service, the TSA, the FBI, and
others, to share information among current government databases), at http://www.afcea.org/
signal/articles/anmvier.asp?a=207 (last visited Sept. 16, 2004); Office of Special Investigations (anti-
terrorism efforts), in TIG BRIEF: THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, Sept 1, 2003, at 9 (describing the Air
Force's "Threat and Local Observation Notice" (TALON) system which logs and shares data
(Vol. 7:1
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parts of the former Total/Terrorism Information Awareness package
appear to be funded to go forward under other "off the books" ap-
propriations.1 5
The Intelligence Community is pursuing an initiative on "Novel
Intelligence from Massive Data" through its "Advanced Research and
Development Activity,' 6 and the Director of the CIA has been man-
dated to "assess the feasibility and advisability of permitting intelli-
gence analysts of various elements of the intelligence community to
access and analyze intelligence from the databases of other ele-
ments.' 7  The National Aeronautic and Space Administration
("NASA") is seeking to develop a "Data mining and Aviation Security"
system that integrates "'the Internet and classified intelligence data'
with information from two flight-safety databases,""' while immigra-
tion and air safety initiatives already are seeking to link a variety of
publicly and privately held databases to screen air passengers and
immigrants. 9 As the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee re-
including private reports of "suspicious persons out of place" filed under the Air Force's "Eagle
Eyes" private informant program).
" Associated Press, US Still Mining Terror Data, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 23, 2004 ("Congressional
officials declined to say which Poindexter programs were killed and which were transferred, but
people with direct knowledge of contracts told AP that the surviving programs included some of
18 data-mining projects known as Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery in Poindexter's re-
search."), at http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,62390,00.html. See TAPAC REPORT,
supra note 5, at vii (maintaining that data mining tools may be used only outside the United
States).
'G Novel Intelligence from Massive Data, Advanced Res. & Dev. Activity (ARDA) [hereinafter
ARDA], at http://www.ic-arda.org/Novel-Intelligence/index.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
17 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-177, § 314, 1117 Stat.
2599, 2610, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003-cr/slO25.html (last visited Sept.
27, 2004).
" Noah Shachtman, NASA's New Antiterrorism Mission, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 21, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,61987,00.html.
q See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-04-385, AVIATION SECURITY: COMPUTER
ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM [CAPPS] FACES SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION
CHALLENGES (2003) (detailing efforts to exempt CAPPS II from Privacy Act protections of rele-
vance and accessibility and failure to establish either accuracy or privacy of screening mecha-
nisms), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04385.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2004);
Ryan Singel, Profiling System Takeoff Delayed, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 12, 2003, at
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,61553,00.html; Press Release, Dep't of Homeland
Security, CAPPS II: Myths and Facts (Feb. 13, 2003) (describing the scope of the air passenger
risk assessment scheme that would employ both commercial and government databases),
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3163.
Implementation of CAPPS II has been scuttled by operational difficulties and the opposition
of privacy advocates, but the Transportation Safety Administration has announced that it in-
tends to pursue similar initiatives. Ryan Singel, Life After Death for CAPPS II, WIRED NEWS, July
16, 2004 ("The government's controversial plan to screen passengers before they board a plane
is dead-but it may return in a new form."), at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/
0,1848,64240,00.html. A similar program to track non-citizens on arrival in the United States is,
however, very much alive. Travel and Transportation: US-VISIT, Dep't of Homeland Security
(providing information about the screening program that uses biometric technology coupled
Sept. 2004]
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cently observed, "TIA was not the ti of the iceberg, but rather one
small specimen in a sea of icebergs.
I. A PAGE OF HISTORY
A. Domestic Surveillance Over Time
This is not the first time that the American government, faced
with the threat of internal disorder, has sought to gather information
about American residents. During the Civil War, the executive
branch deployed a series of agents to track opposition to its war aims,
21as well as active Confederate espionage and subversion. While the
Posse Comitatus Act of 187822 barred the Army from domestic law en-
forcement and the Anti-Pinkerton Act of 189323 limited the federal
executive's capacity to employ private undercover agents, during
World War I the military again developed a substantial internal sur-
veillance and security apparatus in conjunction with the semi-private
American Protective League. 4 The Justice Department established its
own Bureau of Investigation to undertake domestic surveillance.25
Though the domestic military intelligence apparatus was pruned in
with public and private databases for identification and risk assessment of visitors to the United
States), at http://www.dhs.gov/us-visit (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
'0 TAPAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-04-
548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES (2004) [hereinafter GAO,
DATA MINING] (identifying 199 separate data mining projects by federal agencies, 54 of which
use private sector data including DIA and DHS terrorism projects), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
2 See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875) (noting that the President was
"undoubtedly authorized during the war, as commander-in-chief of the armies of the United
States, to employ secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain information respecting the
strength, resources, and movements of the enemy"); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1864)
(recounting arrest and conviction of critic of Civil War policies by military tribunal); JOAN M.
JENSEN, ARMY SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, 1775-1980, at 24-30 (1991) (giving an account of mili-
tary and civilian initiatives); CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILIAN
POLITICS 16-18 (1986) (describing Vallandigham's arrest being carried out by two army cap-
tains in civilian clothes).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
'2 5 U.S.C. § 3108 (2000).
21 See FRANKJ. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 33 (1980) ("The [Justice] Department's
Bureau of Investigation worked closely during the [World War I] years with private patrioteer-
ing groups, principally the American Protective League (APL), officially designed ... for ferret-
ing out spies, slackers, and saboteurs."); JENSEN, supra note 21, at 131-32, 147-49 ("The APL
developed a quasi-military organization to operate secretly within industries.").
2 JENSEN, supra note 21, at 123, 164-65; Major Paul M. Peterson, Civilian Demonstrations Near
the Military Installation: Restraints on Military Surveillance and Other Intelligence Activities, 140 MIL.
L. REV. 113, 116 (1993) ("World War I, however, brought on the first extensive domestic intelli-
gence operations.").
(Vol. 7:1
WATCHING THE WATCHERS
the aftermath of scandals in the 1920s, 26 both military and civilian au-
thorities maintained at least "passive" surveillance of radicals thereaf-
ter.27 Incipient disruption in the depths of the Depression led the
FBI to expand its surveillance of "subversives" and its investigation of
"potential crimes" involving national security.2  With the onset of
European hostilities, the looming threats accompanying World War
II produced further surveillance to protect critical military resources
and allowed the military to reestablish a full-blown internal surveil-
lance program which lasted through the war.29  The Cold War, in
turn, generated an overlapping series of military, civilian and private
investigation, and surveillance agencies seeking to uncover and com-
bat Communist infiltration-surveillance that extended to include
civil rights groups perceived to be allied with or infiltrated by Com-
301munists.
A generation ago, our nation again found itself grappling with the
challenge of providing "homeland security" in the face of what was
perceived as a rising tide of disorder, subversion, and sabotage s.3  Be-
tween 1967 and 1968, the National Guard was mobilized eighty-three
times and the Army was called out four times to suppress domestic ri-
ots. 2 The Army was mobilized in 1969 and 1970 to control protesters
BRUCE W. BIDWELL, HISTORY OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIvISION DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF: 1775-1941, at 277-79 (1986) (describing domestic military intelli-
gence after 1920); JENSEN, supra note 21, at 196-98 (discussing the activities of the Military In-
telligence Division); GEORGEJ.A. O'TOOLE, HONORABLE TREACHERY 4, 319 (1991) (recounting
adverse reaction to surveillance of labor organizers in the state of Washington); David M.
Crane, Divided We Stand: Counterintelligence Coordination Within the Intelligence Community of the
United States, 1995 ARMY LAW. 26, 31 ("The War Department stopped conducting domestic sur-
veillance of alleged radicals after disclosure that the Army was using military intelligence reserv-
ists to conduct unofficial intelligence gathering against United States citizens.").
27 JENSEN, supra note 21, at 199-205; Peterson, supra note 25, at 116 ("Because stateside
counterintelligence agents tended to be underemployed throughout these periods, most were
readily available to perform political surveillance. Significantly, the civilian hierarchy that con-
trolled the military often was ignorant about the extent and nature of domestic intelligence
gathering.").
28 DONNER, supra note 24, at 52-64.
S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. 11 (1976) (describing how the domestic intelligence activities were
reinstituted, expanded, and institutionalized during the wartime under FBI director J. Edgar
Hoover to include subversives, potential criminals, and even political opponents of the Presi-
dent), available at http://old.lib.ucdavis.edu/govdoc/Intelligence/76S9632.pdf (last visited
Sept. 30, 2004);JENSEN, supra note 21, at 211-29.
so S. REP. No. 94-755, at bk. II;JENSEN, supra note 21, at 230-39.
3' Peterson, supra note 25, at 117 (describing disorders and the development by the military
of "two parallel and redundant intelligence collecting apparatus... with an estimated 1500 in-
telligence operatives.").
32 Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("In recent years the Army and the
National Guard have been called upon to act to preserve peace against violent protests against
civil disorders."), rev'd, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); see also id. at 963 n.6 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting)
(quoting Brief of Appellee) ("[D]uring the month of April 1968 alone, there were 237 civil dis-
orders, 27,000 arrests, 43 deaths, over 58 million dollars in property damages, and over 58,000
Sept. 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
converging on Washington to protest the Vietnam War.3 Factions of
antiwar radicals moved from draft resistance and civil disobedience,
illegal in themselves but posing no physical danger, to active violent
attacks on government facilities. In 1969, news media reported over
five hundred bombings in the continental United States; the number
doubled in 1970. " The rate doubled again early in 1971. 3'
In response, the military sought to establish a domestic surveil-
lance mechanism to provide warning and operational intelligence in
36the event of internal disturbances. It shared the fruits of civilian in-
quiry and went on to use its own resources to monitor and infiltrate
political activities it viewed as potentially threatening and to illegally
monitor domestic radio signals.37  As the Defense Department re-
counts the story,
[w]hat had occurred was a classic example of what we would today call
"mission creep." What had begun as a simple requirement to provide ba-
sic intelligence to commanders charged with assisting in the mainte-
nance and restoration of order, had become a monumentally intrusive
effort. This resulted in the monitoring of activities of innocent persons
involved in the constitutionally protected expression of their views on
civil rights or anti-war activities. The information collected on the per-
sons targeted by Defense intelligence personnel was entered into a na-
tional data bank and made available to civilian law enforcement authori-
ties. This produced a chilling effect on political expression by those who
were legally working for political change in domestic and foreign poli-
CiS38cies.8
National Guard and Army troops had to be used 25 times to quell the civil disturbances.");
PYLE, supra note 21, at 34-35 (estimating a total of 300,000 soldiers deployed to preserve domes-
tic order betweenJanuary 1965 and December 1969).
" See PYLE, supra note 21, at 252-53 (describing deployment of twenty thousand federal
troops in November 1969); TOM WELLS, THE WAR WITHIN: AMERICA'S BATTLE OVER VIETNAM
512 (1994) ("[May Day] had taken an immense mobilization of armed might and twelve thou-
sand arrests to keep Washington open.").
" United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 444 F.2d 651, 674 n.1 (6th Cir. 1971) (Weick, J.,
dissenting) ("1096 bombings and 176 attempts were reported in the United States in 1970,
against 549 bombings in 1969."), affd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
-5 407 U.S. at 312 n.12 ("The Government asserts that there were 1,562 bombing incidents
in the United States from January 1, 1971, to July 1, 1971, most of which involved Government
related facilities.").
By way of comparison, in 2000, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) re-
ported 807 actual or attempted bombings; in 2001, 763; in 2002, 711; and in 2003, 386. Arson
& Explosives National Repository, ATF, at http://www.atf.gov/aexis2/statistics.htm (last visited
Sept. 16, 2004).
6 See S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. III (1976) (detailing events leading to establishment and ex-
pansion of internal surveillance programs), available at http://old.lib.ucdavis.edu/govdoc/
Intelligence/76S9633.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
" ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE FROM HOOVER TO
THE HUSTON PLAN 121-22 (1978) (describing illegal monitoring of radio signals).
31 Mission and History, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight), Dep't
of Defense, at http://www.dod.mil/atsdio/mission.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2004).
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On the civilian side, the NSA, the CIA, and the FBI deployed con-
ventional investigative techniques against a variety of domestic critics
and potential opponents, but engaged as well in break-ins, mail open-
ings, warrantless wiretaps, and covert efforts to discredit groups
viewed as potential sources of disruption." The Nixon Administra-
tion sought to marshal all of these agencies as well as the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") and the Defense Intelligence Agency
("DIA") against groups it viewed as threats to "internal security, '
claiming as well the right to engage in extraconstitutional searches
and seizures.41
The Army's Military Intelligence website puts the matter somewhat more succinctly:
"Question: Why do we have intelligence oversight?
Answer: Because MI messed up a while back."
History, Intelligence Oversight, at http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-
ch/io/faq/history.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004); see S. REP. NO. 94-755, at bk. III (giving an
account of surveillance activities including covert penetration of the Poor Peoples' March to
Washington; attendance at a Halloween party for elementary school children in Washington,
D.C., where Army agents suspected a local "dissident" might be present; and maintenance of
files on over 100,000 citizens, including Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Congressman Abner
Mikva, and Senator Adlai Stevenson, III);JENSEN, supra note 21, at 240-47 (recounting military
surveillance during Vietnam protests).
" Thus, the CIA intercepted all international mail to and from individuals and organiza-
tions on a New York City "watch list" over a twenty-year period. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY
THE COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 111-12 (1975) [hereinafter
ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://history-matters.com/archive/church/
rockcomm/contents.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2004). It also deployed its resources against the
anti-war movement under the rubric "Operation CHAOS," accumulating files containing the
names of 300,000 persons and organizations. Id. at 146.
The FBI engaged in a campaign of wiretapping, surveillance, penetration, and harassment
against a variety of dissident groups under the "COINTELPRO" programs. See Hobson v. Wil-
son, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir 1984) (describing operation of FBI harassment); JAMES KIRKPATRICK
DAVIS, SPYING ON AMERICA: THE FBI'S DOMESTIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM 2 (1992)
(discussing the COINTELPRO programs beginning in 1956); THEOHARIS, supra note 37, at
135-55 (describing COINTELPRO).
The NSA surveilled a variety of dissidents under its MINARET program. Id. at 122-23. The
IRS was mobilized to target "dissident" and "extremist" individuals and organizations for audits.
Id. at 188-90.
O THEOHARIS, supra note 37, at 16-17 (describing efforts in 1969 to mobilize intelligence
agencies). The high water mark of this effort was the Huston Plan developed during the sum-
mer of 1970. That White House initiative was approved by President Nixon, though the ap-
proval was later revoked, and attempted to create a permanent interagency committee on do-
mestic protest which would distribute disinformation, engage in electronic surveillance,
kidnapping, infiltration, break-ins, pilfering, and opening of mail. See S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. II
(1976), available at http://old.lib.ucdavis.edu/govdoc/Intelligence/76S9632.pdf (last visited
Sept. 30, 2004);John W. Dean, III, Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 614-15 (2000)
(recounting that his reaction to the Huston Plan when presented to him as the President's
counsel was that "[t] he potential scope of illegal activity by the government was truly frighten-
ing"); THEOHARIS, supra note 37, at 13-39.
" E.g., United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 924-28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting defen-
dant's claim of presidential authority to burglarize the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist to
protect national security interests); Dellinger v. Mitchell, 442 F.2d 782, 784 (D.C. Cir 1971)
(noting "[t]he Government answer asserted that the electronic surveillance was lawful even in
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B. Political Surveillance in the Supreme Court
Both military and civilian efforts were ultimately subjected to legal
challenges that made their way to the Supreme Court.
1. Military Surveillance: Laird v. Tatum
In January of 1970, a former military intelligence officer pub-
lished a description of the extensive domestic political surveillance
files that the Army had developed during the 1960s. Although the
Defense Department initially denied most of the allegations, the
ACLU filed a class action on February 17, 1970 seeking a declaratory
judgment that the program was unconstitutional, an injunction pre-
venting continuation of the program, and the destruction of the in-
telligence files. In April 1970, the trial court dismissed the case on
the ground that the acquisition and filing of information constituted
"no threat to [the plaintiffs'] rights.'4 ' Despite its refusal to allow the
plaintiffs to present evidence or obtain discovery on the nature of the
infiltration undertaken by Army agents, the trial court rested its dis-
missal on the proposition that the Army merely kept "the type of in-
formation that is available to all news media in this country."
4
A year later, in April 1971, the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed by a vote of two to one, remanding for discovery and proof as
to the nature and scope of the Army's domestic intelligence system
and its effect on dissent.45 The majority opinion acknowledged that
the plaintiffs faced "some difficulty in establishing visible injury, at
least on this incomplete record., 46 Nonetheless, the majority was will-
ing to acknowledge that the Army's files resulted in an actionable
"inhibition of lawful behavior and of First Amendment rights,, 47 in
light of the "lon g-established tradition against military involvement in
civilian politics," 8 and of the fact that the military's commanders were
the absence of judicial authorization since the President, acting through the Attorney General,
has constitutional power as the Chief Executive to utilize electronic surveillance [in domestic
security cases] ... free from any judicial supervision or statutory limitation.").
42 Christopher H. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics, WASH.
MONTHLY, Jan. 1970, at 4. A follow-up appeared in Christopher H. Pyle, CONUS Revisited, The
Army Covers Up, WASH. MONTHLY,July 1970.
' Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citing the trial court decision), rev'd,
408 U.S. 1 (1972).
44 Id. at 962-63 (citing the trial court decision).
45 Id.
41 Id. at 953.
41 Id. at 954.
"' Id. at 956.
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"trained as soldiers not lawyers" and were "not accustomed to operat-
ing within the restrictions of law and the processes of the courts." 
9
Rather than risking discovery directed at its domestic surveillance
apparatus, the administration, in turn, sought Supreme Court review,
which was granted in November 1971.5o In the course of briefing, the
Solicitor General highlighted the statements of the lower courts that
the information-gathering activities of the military were based on
publicly-available data, and hence, were analogous to newspaper clip-
ping services, 51 and pressed the proposition that, in the absence of a
showing of specific threat of governmental sanctions, the "visionary
apprehensions" of future misuse of the data created no justiciable
controversy.52
The ACLU and its allies, on the other hand, argued that legislative
investigations 5 and parallel litigation54 that followed the summary
dismissal of Laird in the trial court had revealed an array of both legal
and illegal military surveillance that went far beyond attendance at
public meetings and clipping publications.5 They advanced a series
'9 Id. at 958.
5 Laird v. Tatum, 404 U.S. 955 (1971). The grant of review came five months after the re-
jection of the administration's claim of inherent power to obtain prior restraints against news-
paper publications in the name of national security in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971).
5 Brief for Petitioners at 12, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1971) (No. 71-288) (discussing
"type of information that is available to all news media in this country"); id. at 15 (stating that it
is "essentially no different than what a good newspaper reporter would be able to gather by at-
tendance at public meetings") (citing majority opinion).
52 Id. at 20-21, 24, 26-27 n.24 ("[P]roper course is to await a case presenting concrete evi-
dence of unlawful inhibitory action.").
53 See Lawrence M. Baskir, Reflections on the Senate Investigation of Army Surveillance, 49 IND. L.J.
618, 619-37 (1974) (giving account of the evolution of the Ervin Committee hearings).
" The ACLU had filed a related case in Illinois, which proceeded through presentation of
evidence in a preliminary injunction hearing before being dismissed. ACLU v. Westmoreland,
No. 70-3191 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 21, 1970). Westmoreland was dismissed on January 5, 1971, a
dismissal that was affirmed by ACLUv. Laird, 463 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1116 (1973).
Brief for Respondents at 15-21, Laird (No. 71-288) (referring to the record of Westmore-
land and the Ervin hearings to highlight the continuing retention of political surveillance dossi-
ers, the breadth of the political groups surveilled (including Americans for Democratic Action
and the NAACP), the harmful dissemination of such information, and the covert surveillance
and intrusion that generated the information); Amicus Brief of a Group of Former Army Intel-
ligence Agents at 16-19, 24, Laird (No. 71-288) (highlighting scope of surveillance as described
in hearing testimony, including undercover infiltration, "stake-outs" of the grave of Martin Lu-
ther King, impersonations of news media, illegal monitoring of radio transmissions, and leaking
of information to other government agencies, press, private employers, and subversive hunters);
id. at 26-29 (disputing the Justice Department's "errors and omissions of fact" concerning the
limitations on military surveillance); Amicus Brief of Unitarian Universalist Ass'n at 11, Laird
(No. 71-288) (attaching copies of hearings of Senate Judiciary Committee's Constitutional
Rights Subcommittee, commenting on correspondence with the committee in which executive
officials refuse to eliminate political surveillance data from governmental records).
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of arguments from constitutional theory and social science, along
with the recollection of the McCarthy era, to support the proposition
that accumulation of political surveillance files is likely to chill politi-
cal discussion and participation, and argued that this chill, in itself,
was a cognizable injury.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a five-member majority, held for
the defendants. His opinion acknowledged the "traditional and
strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian
affairs," and offered assurance that no "actual or threatened injury by
reason of unlawful activities of the military" would go unredressed."
The majority opinion determined, however, that the plaintiffs' allega-
tions made out no such injury. Somewhat disingenuously, the opin-
ion repeated the statement of the Court of Appeals that "[s] o far as is
yet shown, the information gathered is nothing more than a good
newspaper reporter would be able to gather by attendance at public
meetings and the clipping of articles from publications available on
any newsstand. 5 8  The existence of such files, the majority deter-
mined, did not make out a claim of "specific present objective harm
or the threat of specific future harm" necessary to provide the plain-
tiffs with standing.5 In the absence of an exercise of "regulatory, pro-
scriptive or compulsory" power by the government, a "subjective
chill" was insufficient.6°
The Government urged the Court to take judicial notice of the existence of the legislative
investigations, Brief for Petitioners at 33-34, Laird (No. 71-288), while relying on judicial char-
acterization of the Army's activities that were at odds with the facts revealed by those hearings.
Cf Reply Brief for Petitioners at 7-10, Laird (No. 71-288) (urging the Court not to rely on ma-
terial presented at the legislative hearings).
'6 Brief for Respondents at 15-21, Laird (No. 71-288).
57 Laird, 408 U.S. at 15-16.
Id. at 9 (citing 444 F.2d at 953). The crucial qualifier "[slo far as is yet shown" made the
statement technically accurate. The opinion's account of what had been "shown" in Laird ig-
nored both the allegations of the complaint of illegal invasions of privacy and the showings of
record in both the parallel Westmoreland litigation and the congressional hearings that occurred
after the record was closed at trial in Laird.
Likewise, the opinion maintained that "the principal sources" of the information were news
media and identified some information as coming from public meetings and civilian law en-
forcement agencies. Id. at 6-7. This statement may or may not have been true, depending on
the definition of "principal"; it was untested factually, and at odds with the plaintiffs' allega-
tions. Plaintiffs maintained that only five percent of the reports came from the news media,
and that the sources of data included illegal electronic surveillance, confidential private sector
records, and covert informers. See Petition for Rehearing at 7-8, Laird (No. 71-288).
" 408 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 11, 13.
[Vol. 7:1
WATCHING THE WATCHERS
2. "Domestic Security" and Presidential Prerogative: United States v.
United States District Court (Keith)
In January of 1971, as the ACLU lawyers were preparing to argue
their case against military blacklists in the D.C. Circuit, another chal-
lenge to domestic political surveillance was beginning its journey to
the Supreme Court. Radical lawyer William Kunstler, defending
three members of the "White Panther Party" charged with conspiracy
to dynamite the CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan, had moved to
compel disclosure of the transcript logs of warrantless wiretaps de-
ployed against his clients, which he argued, would taint their prosecu-
61tion. In response, the Justice Department acknowledged wiretap-
ping one of the defendants without a warrant, but invoked what it
regarded as inherent presidential authority over domestic security to
maintain that the defendants had no right to examine the logs. 62 The
Justice Department advanced the proposition that wiretaps author-
ized by the President or his designee, the Attorney General, to "pro-
tect the nation against hostile acts and to gather information con-
cerning domestic organizations which seek to attack and subvert" the
63government were ipso facto legal. The claim of inherent and extra-
constitutional executive authority in domestic security cases was a
regular feature of the efforts of the Nixon Administration's struggle
against domestic radicals and opponents of the Vietnam war,64 but the
trial judge, Damon Keith, rejected it.65 The Justice Department im-
" United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd sub nom. United
States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971), affd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
62 Id. at 1076-77.
61 Id. at 1079 (quoting from the affidavit filed by the Attorney General).
See, e.g., United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 924-28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting
defendant's claim of presidential authority to burglarize office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist
to protect national security interests); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972) (invoking
executive authority to engage in warrantless wiretapping in the Chicago 8 case); Dellinger v.
Mitchell, 442 F.2d 782, 784 (D.C. Cir 1971) (noting "the Government answer asserted that the
electronic surveillance was lawful even in the absence of judicial authorization since the Presi-
dent, acting through the Attorney General, has constitutional power as the Chief Executive to
utilize electronic surveillance [in domestic security cases] ... free from constitutional or statu-
tory limitations"); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming that the defen-
dant's conviction was not affected by five wiretapped conversations); United States v. Stone, 305
F. Supp. 75 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (determining that the Government did not have to disclose records
of intercepted telephone conversations); United States v. O'Baugh, 304 F. Supp. 767, 768 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) ("Since neither defendant's Fourth Amendment rights nor Section 605 of the Fed-
eral Communications Act of 1934 were violated, the wiretap used by the government to obtain
foreign intelligence information was legal."); United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 429
(C.D. Cal. 1971) (concluding that in "wholly domestic situations there is no national security
exemption from the warrant requirement"); United States v. O'Neal, No. KC-CR-1204 (D. Kan.
Sept. 1, 1970); United States v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. La. 1970) (holding that the moni-
tored telephone conversations by prison officials did not taint defendant's conviction).
65 Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074.
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mediately filed a mandamus action to block implementation of Judge
Keith's order to provide the transcripts (now styled United States v.
United States District Court (Keith)), and on April 18, 1971 the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed.66 The Supreme Court granted the Justice Department's
petition for certiorari; Keith was argued a month before Laird v.
Tatum, and decided a week earlier.67
Unlike Laird, there was no question of justiciability. In the Su-
preme Court, the government acknowledged that the wiretap in
question was a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. But
it took the position that searches ordered by the President or his des-
ignee for purposes of domestic security are "reasonable" searches
even in the absence of a warrant unless the order is determined after
the fact to be arbitrary and capricious.68
The government argued that in the midst of a rising wave of anti-
government bombings, "the President must protect the govern-
ment-and thereby the society for whose benefit it exists."69 Where
the President seeks to obtain information that will be used to prevent
rather than prosecute attacks, the argument continued, the question
of the reasonableness of searches diverges from the criminal justice
model.7° Given the "complicated facts and subtle inferences" in-
volved in domestic intelligence investigations, the Justice Department
concluded that "[a] llowing the Attorney General to authorize such
surveillances without prior approval by a magistrate would centralize
responsibility.., facilitating close control of the use of this investiga-
tive technique. 7 ' "[T] he interest of privacy of the American citizen,"
claimed the government, "is better protected in limiting this author-
ity in the area of electronic surveillance in counterintelligence cases,
to one man-the Attorney General, acting for the President of the
" 444 F.2d 651.
67 407 U.S. 297. Justice Douglas's concurrence in Keith saw the two cases as linked elements
of a "flood of cases" reflecting a concerted federal effort to "subject[] to scrutiny" "[t]hose
who ... dissent or who petition ... for redress." Id. at 329 (Douglas, J., concurring). Citing
those cases, the Ervin hearings and journalistic revelations, he discerned a pattern of surveil-
lance, bugging, interrogation, infiltration, grand jury subpoenas, and efforts to discredit opposi-
tion. Id. at 329-33. At the time, Justice Douglas's rhetoric may have seemed overwrought. In
retrospect he appears to have accurately identified the Nixon Administration's strategy.
8 In the trial court, the Government had argued that the President's inherent authority was
immune from all review. 321 F. Supp. at 1077 (promptingJudge Keith to make the observation
that "[w]e are a country of laws and not of men.").
" Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297
(1972) (No. 70-153).
70 Id.; see also Reply Brief for the United States at 2-3, Keith (No. 70-153).
7' Brief for the United States at 7, 27-28, Keith (No. 70-153). The government argued, as
well, that the Attorney General's judgment is reliable because he is "directly accountable to the
President and through him to the electorate." Petition for Cert. at 8, Keith (No. 70-153).
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United States-rather than to proliferate amongst all of the Federal
sitting judges in the United States."
72
Unlike Laird, the Court in Keith rejected the government's posi-
tion without dissent.73 Justice Powell's opinion acknowledged the
president's "fundamental duty" to "protect, preserve and defend the
Constitution of the United States," the record of "threats and acts of
sabotage," and the "covertness and complexity of potential unlawful
conduct" in domestic security cases.74 But it noted as well that "na-
tional security cases often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth
Amendment values":
History abundantly documents the tendency of Government-however
benevolent and benign its motives-to view with suspicion those who
most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections be-
come the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be
those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to
political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under soS ,75
vague a concept as the power to protect "domestic security.
In light of the "potential danger[s] posed by unreasonable surveil-
lance to individual privacy and free expression," 6 the opinion held,
neither the demands of internal security nor the claims of executive
authority justified the claim that wiretapping, even for "intelligence"
purposes, could be constitutional in the absence of a warrant issued
by a "neutral and detached magistrate., 77 "[U]nreviewed executive
discretion," the court held, "may yield too readily to pressures to ob-
tain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of pri-
vacy and protected speech.7 8
72 Transcript of Oral Argument at *1046, Keith (No. 70-153).
73 Justice Rehnquist, before his elevation to the bench, had been a key player in establishing
both the parameters of civil and domestic surveillance for the Nixon Administration. SeeJeffrey
W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 592-93 (1987) (criticizing
Justice Rehnquist's refusal to recuse himself in Laird); Note, Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Partici-
pate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 106 (1973). He had not recused himself in Laird but
elected to do so in Keith. 407 U.S. at 324. Justice Burger concurred in the result without opin-
ion, id., andJustice White concurred on statutory grounds. Id. at 335.
74 Id. at 310-12.
75 Id. at 313-14.
76 Id. at 315.
77 Id. at 318-21.
"' Id. at 317-22. The Keith case left undecided the issue of whether the President could in-
voke powers unconstrained by the Fourth Amendment in the case of foreign threats. See id. at
308 ("[T]he instant case requires no judgment on the scope of the President's surveillance
power with respect to the activities of foreign powers."). Lower courts divided on the issue.
Compare United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 604-05 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (finding that some
Fourth Amendment protections, but not a prior judicial warrant, might be applicable even
when the President was acting pursuant to his foreign affairs duties), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881
(1974), and United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the Presi-
dent may constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence), with Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (holding
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C. The Risks of Records
Keith rejected the claims of the Nixon Administration. In light of
the risks that surveillance posed to privacy and free expression, it
could not accept the position that the imperatives of domestic secu-
rity suspended the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. When the
government sought information by search or seizure, by physical in-
trusion, or by wiretapping, the Constitution required authorization
from a neutral magistrate. On the other hand, under Laird, where no
"regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory" sanctions were deployed,
gathering information was largely immune from constitutional chal-
lenge. 9 This division of constitutional labor meant that officials were
not constitutionally precluded from compiling dossiers on sensitive
political activities and dissent. So long as the information was not
utilized in formal proceedings, the exclusionary rule could not be
brought to bear even on information that was illegally obtained. Yet
the course of the litigation, combined with contemporaneous investi-
that a warrant is always required when a domestic organization is targeted, even if the surveil-
lance is initiated under the President's foreign intelligence gathering power), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976). Likewise, the Court in Keith suggested that "security intelligence" seeking to
"prevent unlawful activity" or "enhance government preparedness" might be grounds for Con-
gress to alter the standards for issuance of the warrant. 407 U.S. at 322.
" Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972). The distinction between "regulatory" actions,
which were constrained by law, and actions involving the acquisition or dissemination of infor-
mation, which were uncontrolled, was echoed in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976)
(holding that mere defamation through the state's publication of a flyer with the defendant
listed as an active shoplifter without an "alteration in legal status" is insufficient to trigger due
process requirements) and Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977) (holding that neither the
immediate nor the threatened impact of the patient-identification requirements on either the
reputation or the independence of patients for whom certain drugs are medically indicated is
sufficient to constitute an invasion of any right or liberty).
The Laird majority's disingenuous refusal to acknowledge the nature and scope of the
Army's surveillance program, ironically, formed the basis for subsequent distinctions of Laird by
some lower courts. E.g., Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 1997) (enjoining targeted
surveillance in retaliation for filing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) com-
plaint); Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989) (showing of
membership loss by targeted organization confers standing); Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d
1511 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that being the targets of surveillance gives standing to sue for
injunctive relief); Hall v. Pa. State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978) (placing surveillance cam-
eras based on race confers standing); Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc'y of Friends v. Tate,
519 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975) (disseminating information beyond law enforcement circles con-
fers standing); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 151 (D.D.C. 1976) (find-
ing that illegal techniques of surveillance or dissemination of information confers standing);
Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115, 117 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (finding that
intrusive techniques of surveillance gave standing); Handschu v. Special Services Div., 349 F.
Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding that intrusive techniques gave standing). But cf ACLU v.
Laird, 463 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1972) (on request for rehearing) (relying on facts set forth injus-
tice Douglas's dissent in Laird v. Tatum to find that even broad, illegal, and intrusive surveil-
lance would not confer standing).
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gations, highlighted real dangers for civil liberties from the very com-
pilation of dossiers.
1. "You manage what you measure"
As the old chestnut from organizational development handbooks
has it, in any bureaucracy, "you manage what you measure."80 A po-
litical establishment that systematically tracks the involvement of par-
ticular individuals in political support or opposition is a political es-
tablishment that can move to reward supporters and punish critics.
During the Nixon era, intelligence information was put to precisely
this use.
At its worst, a list of political opponents prefigures the danger of
political purges and military coups. As Judge Wilkey, a moderate ju-
rist not generally given to radical paranoia put the concern in the
D.C. Circuit opinion in Laird:
It is highly important for the safety of the country that to the extent con-
sonant with the performance of the military's mission a separation of
sensitive information and military power be maintained, as a separation
of match and powder .... [T]o permit the military to exercise a totally
unrestricted investigative function in regard to civilians, divorced from
the normal restrictions of legal process and the courts, and necessarily
coupling sensitive information with military power, could create a dan-
gerous situation in the Republic.8 '
The files challenged in Laird were probably poorly adapted to ac-
tually implementing a coup. While "counterinsurgency" rhetoric was
occasionally utilized by military planners, the ultimate goal was simply
to provide advance warning of potential riots in which the Army
would be called upon to provide backup for civilian authorities. 2 On
the other hand, the accumulation of "blacklists" of potential agitators
was well adapted to the use of extralegal mechanisms to suppress op-
ponents of existing civil authorities. 3
' E.g., DONALD A. MARCHAND ET AL., MAKING THE INVISIBLE VISIBLE: How COMPANIES WIN
WITH THE RIGHT INFORMATION, PEOPLE AND IT (2001); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89
GEo. L.J. 257, 285-88 (2001); Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance:
You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342-43 (1996).
Tatum v Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 1 (1971).
82 PYLE, supra note 21, at 319-24; see also id. at 324-33 (noting that the official doctrine did
not contemplate the imposition of martial law).
83 The FBI conducted "tens of thousands of domestic intelligence investigations" to identify
candidates for incarceration under the "Emergency Detention of Suspected Security Risks Pro-
vision" of the Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 103, 64 Stat. 987, 1021, which
was repealed in September 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971). MI. Raymond Wan-
nall, Undermining Counter Intelligence Capability, 15 INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE &
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 321-22 (Fall 2002) (lamenting the repeal of this provision); see also
DONNER, supra note 24, at 162-69 (discussing "custodial detention programs"); THEOHARIS,
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The Nixon Administration did not deploy death squads or disap-
pearances against its critics. But the discretion of the modern admin-
istrative state is well adapted to low visibility retaliation. Some such
interventions are blatantly illegal, like focusing IRS audits on political
opponents-as was the custom with the Nixon enemies lists. Others
fall into a gray area of patronage, selective prosecution, and "honest
graft." Most such interventions are difficult to prove to the satisfac-
tion of skeptical courts, so nominal legal protections may be thin ar-
mor against them. On the other hand, none can be effective unless
the identities of opponents and supporters are revealed. A govern-
ment that is limited in its ability to amass information about the po-
litical activities of citizens will be constrained in its efforts to target
such activities for adverse exercises of administrative discretion.
2. Blacklists, Blackmail, Blackened Reputation
In addition to the prospect of governmental retaliation, the acqui-
sition of information provides a level of power that can be exercised
without going through official channels. During the McCarthy era,
the threat of exposure was a substantial weapon in the hands of
red-baiters. In an era when sixty-eight percent of the populace be-
lieved that Communists should be fired from jobs as sales clerks, and
ninety-one percent believed that Communist teachers should be dis-
charged, public registration as a member of the Communist party was
economic suicide, and being named as an "uncooperative" witness
was a pathway to ruin.s4 As the Court observed, when
forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or
even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the witness
may be disastrous.... Those who are identified by witnesses and thereby
placed in the sameglare of publicity are equally subject to public stigma,
scorn and obloquy.
In the COINTELPRO program, during the 1960s, the FBI de-
ployed the prospect of embarrassing exposure against disfavored
groups, and the motive for the illegal burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's
supra note 37, at 40-64 (describing the evolution of the FBI's "Custodial Detention Index" into
the "Security Index" into the "Administrative Index" between 1930 and 1972). Likewise, the
Army counterintelligence program in the 1960s maintained "blacklists" of agitators to be incar-
cerated in the event of civil disturbances. PYLE, supra note 21, 72-73, 344 (describing the series
of mug books, known as "blacklists," which was a "file on individuals involved in underground
activities against an army of occupation and is used by that army as a round-up list").
See DONNER, supra note 24, at 178 (detailing FBI tactic of leaking alleged subversiveness of
uncooperative witnesses to landlords and employers).
' Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957); see, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 248 (1957) ("The sanction emanating from legislative investigations is of a different
kind than loss of employment. But the stain of the stamp of disloyalty is just as deep. The in-
hibiting effect in the flow of democratic expression.., is equally grave.").
[Vol. 7:1
WATCHING THE WATCHERS
psychiatrist's office was an effort to find information that could dis-
credit the release of the Pentagon Papers. 6
3. Chilling Effects: "I'll Be Watching You"
Uncontrolled surveillance may be effective in repressing dissent
even where dossiers are not deployed to achieve any concrete results.
Opposition to the surveillance of the Nixon Administration was
rooted in the observed effects of the red-hunting of the 1950s. In
Lamont v. Postmaster General, the Court wrote in the shadow of its ex-
perience with McCarthyism of the "almost certain deterrent effect" of
being listed in government files as one who requests "communist
propaganda":
Public officials, like schoolteachers who have no tenure, might think they
would invite disaster if they read what the Federal Government says con-
tains the seeds of treason. Apart from them, any addressee is likely to
feel some inhibition in sending for literature which federal officials have
817condemned as "communist political propaganda.
Vulnerability can arise not only from the observation of dissident
activities, but from sufficiently penetrating documentation of non-
political transgressions. Authorities who have sufficient knowledge of
a fallible citizenry are in a position to cow dissent by the mere fact of
their prosecutorial discretion. Justice Jackson observed:
I cannot say that our country could have no central police without be-
coming totalitarian, but I can say with great conviction that it cannot be
totalitarian without a centralized national police.... [A national police]
will have enough on enough people, even if it does not elect to prosecute
them, so that it will find no opposition to its policies."s
The very sense of exposure to view, moreover, encourages indi-
viduals to engage in actions that society desires. Unorthodox but
protected activities are less likely to be undertaken when subject to
examination. The author who must expose every draft to the public
See, e.g., United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting that even
the Government brief conceded that the reasons for interest in Ellsberg's psychiatric records
"were, at best mixed" and included creating a "negative press image" of Ellsberg); DAVIS, supra
note 39 (1992) (detailing COINTELPRO tactics); DONNER, supra note 24, at 170-72 (detailing
dissemination of files); id. at 177-237 (describing COINTELPRO tactics).
s7 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965); see, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544
(1963) ("Inviolability of privacy in group association [is] indispensable to [the] preservation of
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs."); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960) ("To compel a teacher to disclose his every associational
tie is to impair that teacher's right of free association.") (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462 ("[Clompelled disclosure of affiliation
with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of associa-
tion as [taxes or punishments].").
m ROBERT H.JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 70-
71(1955).
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is likely to turn out a more timid product than the one who can try
out alternatives in private. The ability to experiment in the realm of
the intimate is valuable not only for the society it builds, but for the
citizens' sense of freedom and character. Unwanted observation by
others is itself a limitation of autonomy, and the more intimate the
observation, the greater the violation. To retain a sense of control
over who can observe us nurtures our sense of independence; control
over disclosure of intimate matters may be essential to our sense of
identity. Conversely, the power of the state to inflict the sense of vul-
nerability is itself a sanction.
It was in recognition of these effects that Justice Powell empha-
sized in Keith:
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an
unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized offi-
cial eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Gov-
ernment action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than
open public discourse, is essential to our free society.89
D. The Settlement of the 1970s
In the congressional hearings on military surveillance, then-
Assistant Attorney General (and later ChiefJustice) Rehnquist argued
that it was "quite likely that self-discipline on the part of the executive
branch will provide an answer to virtually all of the legitimate com-
plaints against excesses of information-gathering."90  Executive self-
discipline in the administration for which he spoke at the time was
manifestly underdeveloped. Yet, in the next seven years, the most ef-
fective responses to the dangers of databases did emerge from the po-
litical branches. Executive and legislative initiatives erected a web of
constraints on political surveillance that imposed a measure of ac-
countability on the programs left beyond judicial control by Laird.
The Ervin hearings on Army surveillance and the revelations of
Watergate impelled Congress in 1974 to adopt the Federal Privacy
Act, limiting both retention and use of information regarding private
individuals by federal agencies.' In 1975, the Senate formed the
'9 United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on Constitutional Liberties
and the Rule of Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 n.84 (quoting testimony of then-Assistant Attorney
General William Rehnquist).
9' In addition to structural limits, the Privacy Act specifically limits collection of political in-
formation:
Each agency that maintains a system of records shall. .. maintain no record describing
how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly
authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless
pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.
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Church Committee and the House convened the Pike Committee to
review and report on abuses by the intelligence community,92 and in
the next session they established permanent intelligence oversight
committees in both the House and Senate. In 1978, agencies were
required to establish inspectors general, 94 and in the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), Congress directly addressed the is-
sue of foreign intelligence searches that the Court had pretermitted
in Keith
5
In the executive branch, executive orders issued by Presidents
Ford, Carter, and Reagan set constraints on the activities of the intel-
ligence community.96 The Defense Department established an Office
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (7) (2004). The protections of the Privacy Act, however, do not extend to
data matching for national security and law enforcement purposes. See §§ 552a(b) (7),
(a) (8) (B) (vi), and (j).
In 1974, Congress also strengthened and expanded the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974). See also 120 CONG. REC. H36,633 (1974)
(showing a House veto override); 120 CONG. REC. S36,882 (1974) (showing a Senate veto over-
ide); Veto of Freedom of Information Act Amendments: The President's Message to the
House of Representatives Returning H.R. 12,471 Without His Approval, 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1318 (1974) (describing President Gerald Ford's veto). Among other innovations, the
amendments extended FO1A to some investigative material, 88 Stat. 1563-64 (amending 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(7)) (limiting the exemption for investigative material and requiring that rea-
sonably segregable material must still be disclosed); established time limits for disclosure; and
strengthened judicial enforcement, 88 Stat. 1562-63 (amending § 552(a)) (providing adminis-
trative deadlines for disclosure and allowing judges to order production of records).
12 On January 29, 1976, the House Select Intelligence Committee (the Pike Committee) is-
sued its final report, which was never officially released but was published in part in VILLAGE
VOICE, Feb. 16, 1976, at 1, and later in book form in Britain under the title CIA, THE PIKE
REPORT (Spokesman Books 1977). On April 26, 1976, the Church Committee issued its final
report, S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976) (recommending a bar on domestic CIA activities). These fol-
lowed the report of the Rockefeller Commission, created January 4, 1975 by President Gerald
Ford. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 39.
" H.R. Res. 658, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 22,932, 22,932-49 (1977); S. Res. 400, 94th
Cong., 122 CONG. REC. 14,657, 14,673-75 (1976).
9' Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
95 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2000)). FISA provided that no "U.S. Person"
may become a target of FISA surveillance "solely upon the basis of activities protected by the
first amendment." §§ 1805(a) (3) (A), 1824(a) (3) (A).
Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7707 (1976) [hereinafter Ford Order]; Exec. Order
No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978) [hereinafter Carter Order], revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981) [hereinafter Reagan Order]. These Orders limited the col-
lection of intelligence regarding "United States persons," mandated the use of the "least intru-
sive collection techniques feasible within the United States or directed against United States
persons abroad," precluded the CIA from electronic surveillance within the United States, and
largely limited searches and surveillance within the United States to the FBI. Reagan Order at
59,950-52; see also Carter Order at §§ 2-202 to 2-206; Ford Order at § 5. The Carter and Reagan
Orders also precluded agencies other than the FBI from seeking to covertly influence organiza-
tions in the United States, while constraining covert participation of any sort. Reagan Order at
59,952; Carter Order at § 2-207; see also U.S. Postal Service, Inspection Service Authority, 39
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of Inspector General for Intelligence in 1976, which became the As-
sistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) in 1982.
97
Attorney General Edward Levi, in 1976, promulgated guidelines on
Domestic Security Investigation which substantially constrained the
FBI's political surveillance, authorizing full investigation only on the
basis of actual or incipient conduct, rather than ideology or advo-
cacy98 and only in a manner "designed and conducted so as not to
limit the full exercise of rights protected by the Constitution and laws
of the United States." 99
Beyond the limits embodied in positive law, aggressive Congres-
sional investigation and exposure proved as important as statutory
controls. The trauma of the hearings and the firestorm of outrage
those hearings produced has etched in organizational culture of a
number of agencies the impropriety of abusing security intelligence.
II. THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11
A. The World Turned Upside Down
Since the convulsions of the 1970s, the concerns which fueled the
imposition of constraints on the gathering and use of political intelli-
gence have remained strong. In the Supreme Court, a series of cases
have cemented status of informational privacy as a constitutional
norm linked both to autonomy and free expression.'00 In Bartnicki v.
C.F.R. § 233.3 (2003) (constraining the use of "mail covers") (adopted originally as 40 Fed. Reg.
11,579 (1975)).
17 Organizational Charter, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight), 32
C.F.R. pt. 378 (1983) (establishing the office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for In-
telligence Oversight); see also Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Compo-
nents that Affect United States Persons, Dep't of Defense Directive No. 5240.1-R (1982) (estab-
lishing substantive and procedural limits on the conduct of intelligence activities), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/p52401r.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
Each service also has established its own intelligence oversight office.
9' Attorney General Edward Levi, Attorney General's Guidelines on Domestic Security Inves-
tigations (Apr. 5, 1976) [hereinafter Levi Guidelines], reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings
on S. 1612 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 18-26 (1978). These guidelines were
subsequently loosened somewhat by the Reagan Administration. See Attorney General William
French Smith, Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and
Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 7, 1983), reprinted in 32 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA)
3087 (1983). The Levi Guidelines, for example, required "specific and articulable facts," show-
ing actual or incipient criminal violations before commencing a full investigation, while the
Smith version required only a "reasonable indication" as the legal standard for opening a "full"
investigation. For discussions of the differences between the two sets of guidelines, see Alliance
to End Repression v. City of Chi., 742 F.2d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 1984);John T. Elliff, TheAttorney
General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 785 (1984).
Levi Guidelines, supra note 98, at 11(B).
'0 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166-67 (2002) (finding
ordinance prohibiting door-to-door advocacy with a permit as violative of the First Amendment
(Vol. 7:1
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Vopper, an otherwise divided court recently coalesced around the
proposition, echoed verbatim by majority and dissent:
In a democratic society privacy of communication is essential if citizens
are to think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or suspicion that
one's speech is being monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of
such activity, can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to
voice critical and constructive ideas.101
Courts and the public continue to view the prospect of surveillance
and disclosure as evils of constitutional magnitude. Yet today, the set-
tlement of the 1970s is coming unglued, for the limits imposed by
Keith and the administrative constraints of the 1970s have become in-
creasingly permeable.
At a technical level, a variety of surveillance techniques have be-
come available to intelligence and law enforcement agencies that nei-
ther invade physical spaces or intercept conversations that can claim
protection under the Fourth Amendment.0 2  The Fourth Amend-
ment has, moreover, been held inapplicable to acquisition of infor-
mation from private parties to whom that information has been en-
trusted. Thus, the Court has held that when government agencies
seek bank records from bankers, or telephone logs from telephone
companies, they do not engage in "searches" which require either
probable cause or warrant. Given the dependence of Internet
protection accorded to anonymous discourse); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525
U.S. 182, 199-204 (1999) (striking down required public identification of collectors of signa-
tures as a violation of the First Amendment); Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,
341-42 (1995) (protecting an author's decision to remain anonymous under the First Amend-
ment); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 767 (1986)
("[R]eporting requirements raise the specter of public exposure and harassment of women who
choose to exercise their... right... to end a pregnancy."); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74
Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982) (discussing "risk of harassment" of contributors to
minority party); see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of
campaign financing and political restrictions under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, but acknowledging importance of First Amendment privacy inter-
ests); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611-12 (1999) (holding that unnecessary presence of news
reporters in search of home violated Fourth Amendment); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992) (finding mandatory notice to husband constituted undue burden in
exercise of constitutional right to abortion).
... 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2000) (quoting President's Commission of Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice, THE CHALLENGE OF A FREE SOCIETY 202 (1967)); id. at 543 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
102 E.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (observation from helicopter is not a
"search"); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-35, 239 (1986) (aerial photo-
graph is not a "search"). These cases could be read to allow unconstrained "overhead surveil-
lance" by satellite, video surveillance, and e-mail interception. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
33-34 (2001), places some limits on the use of technology to invade "private spaces," but the
precise boundaries are quite unclear.
'03 Smith v. Maryland 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (finding that "pen register" does not re-
quire warrant, since telephone numbers are disclosed to telephone company); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (finding depositor has no "reasonable expectation of pri-
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communication on intermediaries, this opens a vast array of commu-
nications to government surveillance. 4
Encroachment on informational privacy, moreover, need not ini-
tially involve explicit efforts to spy on citizens. As I put the point in
1991:
The night watchman state is dead in America, if indeed it ever lived.
Modern American government, like governments elsewhere, has taken
progressively greater responsibility for functions that previously had been
left to the market or other social structures. In the late twentieth cen-
tury, the bureaucrat-who dispenses benefits and licenses, who hires and
fires, who plans health care programs or fiscal policy-has replaced the
police officer, judge, or soldier as the icon of government.
In the course of her job, the bureaucrat learns more intimate details
about citizens than would the police officer or the judge. Implementa-
vacy" in bank records); Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 54 (1974) (finding that re-
quired maintenance of bank records does not violate Fourth Amendment). Given the emerg-
ing availability of cell phone tracking technology, see Amy Harmon, Lost? Hiding? Your Cellphone
Is Keeping Tabs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al, access to telephone records will become even
more revealing.
Again, there may be limits on the revelations of particular trusted intermediaries, e.g., Fergu-
son v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79-80 (2001) (holding that patients have "legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy" in medical records), but those limits are far from sharply etched.
'" Eg., Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That
Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 627-29 (2003) (arguing that disclosure doctrine leaves Internet
communications without constitutional protection). The capacity to examine the contents of e-
mails through such technologies as Carnivore and ECHELON is constrained in some circum-
stances by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and subject to FISA under the USA
PATRIOT Act. Id. at 656. Once access is gained, moreover, there is likely to be an arms race
between cryptography-using subjects of surveillance and government monitors. Ted Bridis, FBI
Is Building a 'Magic Lantern; Software Would Allow Agency to Monitor Computer Use, WASH. POST,
Nov. 23, 2001, at A15. This legal constellation allows proponents of increased surveillance to
claim that statutory amendments decreasing privacy do not interfere with "constitutional
rights."
An increasing number of employers, moreover, monitor the Internet connections of their
employees. See Elia Zureik, Who Knows What About Whom? Towards a Generalized Surveil-
lance, Presentation at the Third UNESCO Philosophy Forum (Sept. 14, 2003) (reporting more
than two-thirds of employers monitor employees internet activities), at http://www.queensu.ca/
sociology/Surveillance/publications-zureik.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2004). Current doctrine
imposes no limitations on the capacity of employers to provide the records of such monitoring
to governmental officials or, presumably, pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act], Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287-88, of officials to demand copies of logs of such monitoring.
The question of whether the government can access information obtained by "cookies"
placed by private internet sites stands at the confluence of a variety of opaque statutory regimes
including the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, which encompasses the
Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1030; the USA PATRIOT Act, § 215; the extended Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311;
and National Security Letter authority, 18 U.S.C. § 2709. See, e.g., Lee Kovarsky, Note, Tolls on
the Information Superhighway: Entitlement Defaults for Clickstream Data, 89 VA. L. REV. 1037 (2003)
(discussing the collection of clickstream data and the legal rules that should govern it).
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tion and planning personnel have voracious appetites for information,
and every license, benefit, or exemption makes the government privy to
the details of a citizen's life. Information gathered in one arena is avail-
able for use in others. Similarly, the increasing rationalization and routi-
nization of the private sector has generated stores of information poten-
tially available to the government. Every employer accumulates
information about her employees, every granter of credit files data about
her customers, every transfer of funds leaves an increasingly accessible
data trail, all of which is susceptible to government subpoena or re-105
quest.
The phenomenon has burgeoned in the last decade. Government
has continued to collect more information, and records have become
increasingly digitized and hence increasingly available for analysis
and examination. 1°6 The exploding collection of consumer informa-
tion by private sector actors, from retailers to credit intermediaries to
insurance companies, moreover, has produced enormous pools of in-
formation which can be adapted to domestic surveillance.'0
In the aftermath of September 11, many businesses volunteered
or grudgingly surrendered access to their records to law enforcement
or intelligence officials.1 8  Others made access to their data ware-
houses available for purchase. For example, one private company,
ChoicePoint, has contracted to provide a variety of federal agencies
'05 Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclo-
sure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (199 1).
... One example should suffice: EZ Pass technology, which allows prepayment of tolls, can
double as a tracking mechanism. For more extensive examples, see A. Michael Froomkin, The
Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1468-1502 (2000).
0'7 See AndrewJ. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Con-
sumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 63, 65-79 (2003) ("Acxiom's InfoBase profiler collects
data from more than 15 million sources and contains demographic information on 95 percent
of U.S. households. Experian boasts that its databases cover 98 percent of U.S. households and
can contain more than 1000 data items per household. Polk's 'Automotive Profiling System'
contains demographic and lifestyle information on more than 150 million vehicle owners and
111 million households.... By storing small text files called 'cookies' on the computers of per-
sons visiting DoubleClick-affiliated sites, the company has stockpiled profiles of more than 100
million individuals," and continuing a list of other stockpiles of data.); cf Peter Lyman & Hal R.
Varian, How Much Information?, (2003) (finding that 5.4 billion gigabytes of information were
stored in 2002, compared with 3.2 billion gigabytes in 1999), available at http://
www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003 (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
08 E-bay, for example, has volunteered to provide law enforcement with its enormous pro-
prietary stock of data. See Ernest Miller & Nimrod Kozlovski, eBay to Law Enforcement-We're Here
to Help, LAwMEME, Feb. 17, 2003, http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme. The FBI has obtained
information voluntarily provided by organizations ranging from dive shop operators to super-
markets. Ben Worthen, What to Do When Uncle Sam Wants Your Data, CIO MAGAZINE, Apr. 15,
2003 (reporting a study in which forty-one percent of respondents said they are willing to share
information without a court order if they believe it is in the interest of national security), at
http://www.cio.com/archive/041503/data.hunl (last visited Sept. 30, 2004). Likewise, airlines
have provided passenger information voluntarily (and possibly illegally) to government agen-
cies seeking to prevent terrorism. See infra note 111.
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the capacity to search and correlate a vast array of data the company
gathers from private sources, ranging from credit bureaus to insur-
ance underwriters to travel agencies, as well as local state and federal
agencies, including motor vehicle records, liens, deed transfers,
criminal records, voter rolls, and military personnel records. 0 9 The
FBI, which provides desktop access to ChoicePoint for its agents, has
taken the position that obtaining access to this information is "mini-
mally intrusive," and is not substantially limited by the constraints de-
veloped in the 1970s." ° The position is presumably echoed by the ar-
ray of other federal agencies that make use of ChoicePoint and
similar data services.1"' Conversely, the MATRIX system, based in
Florida, proposes to link state, federal, and private databases in a
searchable configuration.
1 2
The response to the threat of terrorism, moreover, has substan-
tially enhanced federal capacities to obtain information without the
consent of the subjects or holders of data. The tragedy of September
11 made real risks that had heretofore been hypothetical; the costs of
'0 See, e.g., Shane Harris, Private Eye, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, Mar. 16, 2004 (detailing
ChoicePoint's records and noting ChoicePoint owns nineteen billion records), at
http://www.govexec.com/features/0304/0304sl.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2004); Glenn R.
Simpson, Big Brother in Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on You, It May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL
ST.J., Apr. 13, 2001, at Al. For ChoicePoint's own account of its "point and click" services, see
ChoicePoint Business & Government Solutions, at http://www.cpgov.com (last visited Sept. 30,
2004). ChoicePoint has also begun to make its services broadly available to the private sector.
E.g., Adam Geller, Employee Security Checks Go Retail COM. APPEAL, Mar. 7, 2004, at GI.
"0 Office of Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Sec. Law Unit, Guidance Regarding the Use of ChoicePoint
for Foreign Intelligence Collection or Foreign Counterterrorism Investigations (Sept. 17, 2001)
(providing legal opinion that ChoicePoint files are "publicly available data," and therefore
"minimally intrusive"), http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbia.pdf; Simpson, supra
note 109 (giving account of desktop access). In many FBI offices personally assigned computers
are in a "closed" network; to access ChoicePoint, or any other "outside" network requires that a
person go to a stand-alone terminal. Personal Communication from M.E. Bowman, Senior
Counsel to the FBI (June 21, 2004) (on file with author).
. E.g., Brian Bergstein, Database Measured Terrorism Quotient, May 20, 2004 (describing
120,000 person list of individuals with a "high terrorism quotient" provided by private database
owner Sesint to federal authorities, based on "such factors as age, gender, ethnicity, credit his-
tory, 'investigational data,' information about pilot and driver licenses, and connections to
'dirty' addresses known to have been used by other suspects"), http://apnews.myway.com/
article/20040520/D82M9B400.html. According to one report, the 120,000 list was refined to
1,200, which formed the basis for investigations and some arrests. Robert O'Harrow, Jr.,
Anti-Terror Database Got Show at White House, WASH. POST, May 21, 2004, at A12; see also Ryan
Singel, CAPPS II Stands Alone, Feds Say, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004 (discussing proposal to allow
security personnel to verify travelers identities by checking commercial databases such as those
owned by ChoicePoint, Acxiom and LexisNexis), at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/
0,1848,61891,00.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004); Ryan Singel & Noah Shachtman, Army Admits
UsingJetBlue Data, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 23, 2003 (recounting release to Army contractor, Torch
Concepts, of millions of records ofJetBlue passengers and comparison of the data with available
private sector data to "ferret... out... secretive people"), at http://www.wired.com/news/
privacy/0,1848,60540,00.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
112 See MATRIX, supra note 11.
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ignorance became horrifyingly concrete. In the immediate aftermath
of that trauma, legislative and administrative changes have weakened
statutory constraints on collection and sharing of data within the fed-
eral structure.1 s Likewise, international cooperation holds the possi-
bility of allowing U.S. intelligence agencies to avoid domestic limits
on electronic surveillance. l 4  Identification of the Islamist bases of al
Qaeda as a prime source of danger has fueled relaxation of adminis-
trative limits on surveillance of religious institutions, and Internet
websites or bulletin boards.1 5 At the same time the perceived needs
of the fight against terrorism have loosened the administrative con-
straints imposed during the 1970s on the FBI's use of other investiga-
tive techniques.
1 1 6
"3 Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 278-81,
amended FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (3) (d) to permit disclosure of grand jury information when the
matters involve "foreign intelligence and counterintelligence"; Section 504, 115 Star. at 364-65,
amended the FISA to permit consultation between intelligence officials conducting
FISA-approved surveillance efforts and law enforcement officials.
.. At least one source claims that British and U.S. intelligence agencies exchange surveil-
lance information on each others' citizens, Phillip Knightley, How Britain and the US Keep Watch
on the World, INDEP. (London), Feb. 27, 2004, although the scope of such cooperation has not
been proved.
115 See Attorney General John Ashcroft, Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes,
Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, pt. VI.A.2, at 22 (May 30,
2002) [hereinafter Ashcroft Guidelines] (authorizing suspicionless "visits" to "any place" or at-
tendance at "any event open to the public."), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/
generalcrimes2.pdf; id. pt. VI.B.2, at 22 (authorizing suspicionless monitoring of online sites
and forums); see also id. pt. VI.A.1, at 21 (authorizing maintenance of databases from any
source).
Part VI.C.1 of the Ashcroft Guidelines cautions that authorized activities "do not include
maintaining files on individuals solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the
First Amendment." Id. at 23 (emphasis added). Given the enthusiasm with which the current
Justice Department parses its authority, presumably, files maintained partially for the purpose
of monitoring First Amendment activities, but also for the purpose of preventing terrorism (or
of gratifying the curiosity of the attorney general) would not fall under the prohibition.
"' Like the guidelines they modified, the Ashcroft Guidelines provide:
It is important that such investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the
First Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States. When, however, statements advocate criminal activity
or indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of violence, an in-
vestigation under these Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent, from the cir-
cumstances or the context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of
harm.
Id. pt. I, at 7. Compare Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General's Guidelines on
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations, pt. I
(Mar. 21, 1989) [hereinafter Thornburgh Guidelines], at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
readingroom/generalcrimea.htm, with Ashcroft Guidelines, supra note 115, pt. I, at 7.
The Ashcroft guidelines also comment in Part III that "special care must be exercised in
sorting out protected activities from those which may lead to violence or serious disruption of
society." Id. at 13. However, where prior guidelines required FBI Headquarters approval and
notice to the Justice Department before undercover operatives infiltrated organizations "in a
manner that may influence the exercise of First Amendment rights, see Thornburgh Guidelines,
supra, pt. IV.B.3, the Ashcroft guidelines drop or dilute that requirement.
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Post-September 11 statutory innovations have provided new au-
thority to demand information without judicial supervision or prob-
able cause, "7 have obliged courts to issue secret subpoenas and "trap
and trace orders" on an ex parte FBI showing of "relevance" rather
The prior guidelines directed that "[blefore employing an investigative technique in an in-
quiry, the FBI should consider whether the information could be obtained in a timely and ef-
fective way by less intrusive means.... [T]he techniques used in an inquiry should generally be
less intrusive than those used in a full investigation," id. pt. II.B.4, and required a showing of
compelling circumstances for "highly intrusive" techniques, id. pt. II.B.6. The Ashcroft guide-
lines by contrast admonish: "The FBI shall not hesitate to use any lawful techniques consistent
with these Guidelines, even if intrusive, where the intrusiveness is warranted." Ashcroft Guide-
lines, supra note 115, pt. I, at 7; see also id. pt. II.B.4, at 9 (discussing the choice of investigative
techniques).
17 The USA PATRIOT Act conferred upon the FBI new authority to issue "national security
letters" that require the production of information without any showing of probable cause or
judicial process, conferring on the FBI the new unconstrained and unilateral ability to invoke
inquisitorial powers that previously resided in grand juries seeking to prosecute crimes. 18
U.S.C. § 2709(b) (1) (2000), amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, permits the FBI to demand
secret access to telephone and ISP records without judicial approval so long as the "records
sought are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person
is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment." This au-
thority has been challenged by ACLU v. Ashcroft (Sealed Case 04 Civ. 2614 (VM)). See ACLU,
ACLU Challenge to "National Security Letter" Authority, at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/
SafeandFree.cfm?ID=15543&c=262 (last visited Sept. 30, 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).
Similar authority and constraints apply to the newly available national security letters to fi-
nancial institutions seeking "a customer's or entity's financial records." 12 U.S.C.
§ 3414(a)(5)(A) (authorizing the release of financial records for "foreign counter intelligence
purposes ... provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted
solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States").
Tide 31, section 5312(a) (2) of the United States Code extends National Security Letter au-
thority over "financial institutions" to include "an operator of a credit card system;" "a travel
agency;" "a casino, gambling casino;" or "any other business designated by the Secretary whose
cash transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters." 31
U.S.C. § 5312(a) (2) (2002).
The "financial records" to which the FBI may demand access include any "information
known to have been derived from, any record held by a financial institution pertaining to a cus-
tomer's relationship with the financial institution." 12 U.S.C. § 3401(2). Unless the definition
of what records pertain "to the customer's relationship" is construed narrowly, it appears that
the FBI now has secret and unsupervised access to many commercial databases in the private
sector, so long as it can claim the records are "relevant to an authorized investigation of inter-
national terrorism." Cf Waye v. First Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 846 F. Supp. 310, 316 (M.D. Pa.
1994) (holding that cancelled checks are "financial records"). The requirement that the re-
quest be one "for a customer or entity's financial records" may preclude plenary dragnet
searches or data mining.
Likewise, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations pro-
vide that, "A covered entity may disclose protected health information to authorized federal
officials for the conduct of lawful intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other national security
activities authorized by the National Security Act (50 U.S.C. § 401) and implementing authority
(e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333)." 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k) (2).
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than probable cause,"' and have authorized the secret issuance of
surveillance and wiretap orders by the FISA court under a standard
quite different from normal "probable cause."""' Even where acquisi-
tion of information is constrained, the exponential increase in the
capacity to aggregate and analyze information obtained by non-
coercive and non-surreptitious measures gives government the op-
portunity to acquire vastly more extensive and penetrating oversight
than the capabilities provided by the techniques at issue in Laird v.
Tatum.2" Not only are current data processing techniques able to
transcend the "practical obscurity"'' that previously attended the size
and difficulty of accessing large amounts of data (as for example, by
searching out the past addresses or buying habits of targeted indi-
viduals), but they are able as well to engage in "data mining" to dis-
cover information that was previously only implicit in available data
(for example by correlating purchasers of particular periodicals with
l Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat. at 287-88, the FBI now has author-
ity to trigger non-discretionary judicial orders to obtain "any tangible things (including books,
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation... to protect against interna-
tional terrorism." 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (a)(1) (2004). However, the investigation may not be "con-
ducted of a United States person solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Id. § 1861(2) (B). More narrowly, the
FBI can now obtain orders for the production of the contents of consumer reports on a similar
showing. 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(c) (2000).
The authority granted by the USA PATRIOT Act also provides for automatic issuance judi-
cial orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices without probable cause. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1842(a) (1). Courts requested to issue an order authorizing the use of pen registers and trap
and trace devices for internet activities and e-mail must issue such orders when a Government
attorney certifies that the information likely to be obtained is "information relevant to an ongo-
ing investigation to protect against international terrorism" and that the investigation (if it is an
investigation of a U.S. person) "is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by
the first amendment to the Constitution." Id. § 1842(c) (2).
"9 Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat. at 291, amended FISA to permit secret
warrants for interception of communications or physical searches to issue without probable
cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed so long as foreign intelligence
gathering or antiterrorist investigation is a "significant purpose" of the surveillance (as opposed
to the "primary" purpose of the surveillance), and there is probable cause to believe that the
target (or owner of the premises) is an "agent of' a foreign organization. See generally In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719-20 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002). For "United States per-
sons," a somewhat higher showing of probable cause is required to show that the person is an
"agent of a foreign power." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2) (including persons as to whom there is
probable cause to believe that they have "knowingly" assumed "a false or fraudulent identity,"
gathered intelligence in a fashion that "may involve" violation of a federal statute, or aided or
abetted the same).
2 See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 106 (describing synergistic effect of increase in computer
storage and networking along with increased data collection technologies). The GAO reports
that 199 separate data mining projects are currently being undertaken by federal agencies, fifty-
four of which use private sector data. GAO, DATA MINING, supra note 20.
121 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762
(1989) (recognizing the value of practical obscurity of FBI rap sheets and protecting them from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act).
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membership in particular organizations or presence at particular ral-
lies, and estimating the probability that particular subjects will rent
particular videos, or vote Republican) .
B. The Present Danger
It is a mistake to view the structures of information control that
developed in response to the Nixon abuses solely as a matter of indi-
vidual rights to avoid surveillance, or to maintain "privacy" in the ab-
stract. Limits on surveillance constitute structural hedges that make
other abuses more difficult. In particular, retaliation for dissent is
less likely if dissenters are not tracked. 2 1 Yet, even as the structural
limits of the 1970s on surveillance decay, responses to terrorism
sharpen the dangers to political liberty.
In the world after September 11, while we are still quite a distance
from the prospect of a military coup, the potentials for retaliation
have multiplied. Attorney General John Ashcroft has regularly stated
that in pursuing what he refers to as a "fundamentally different ap-
proach to law enforcement," he encourages his employees to "think
outside of the box-but never outside of the constitution.' ' 4 Unfor-
tunately, on this subject, like others, the Attorney General's concept
of constitutional constraints may diverge from those to which we are
accustomed; the current administration seems to view constitutional
rights as obstacles to be circumnavigated rather than ideals to be at-
tained. As long as there is a colorable argument that determinative
Supreme Court precedent does not directly preclude an action, the
Ashcroft Justice Department seems to consider that it is not "outside
of the constitution."
The current administration has claimed the right to imprison
"unlawful combatants" without process and without judicial review.1
' See, e.g., RA. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of
Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2, pt. I.A (2003/2004) (outlining the importance of data
mining and "knowledge discovery" techniques and contrasting them with simple data inquiry
techniques), at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=5&article=2; Tal Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seek-
ing Solutions: Using Implementation Based Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of
Data Mining and the Internet Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 13, 42 (2004).
12 Similarly, one of the major objections to domestic military intelligence is that it makes
military less dependent on civilian branches (and localities) in domestic operations. E.g., PYLE,
supra note 21, at 406 (discussing how the Attorney General opposed military intelligence be-
cause it posed dangers to civilian control and federalism).
124 U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at the Eighth Circuit Judges Conference
(Aug. 7, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/O80702eighthcircuitjudgesag
remarks.htm.
'2 See Brief for the Petitioner, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027).
This brief maintains that the President has inherent "authority to seize and detain enemy com-
batants wherever found," id. at 38, whether those individuals are citizens or aliens, and inside or
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The Bush administration initially claimed authority to prosecute be-
fore secret and unreviewable military tribunals any non-citizen the
president deemed an "unlawful combatant.' ' 126 It has since provided
some basic procedural protections by regulation to defendants in
military tribunals, but continues to maintain in court the position
that it has unreviewable authority to detain "enemy combatants,"
whether lawful or unlawful, citizen or alien. 27  The administration
has, so far as the public record reveals, sought to exercise these pow-
ers fairly narrowly; it has not rounded up critics and incarcerated
them in naval brigs. Further, a majority of the Supreme Court has re-
jected the claims that the efforts to detain "unlawful combatants" can
proceed entirely free from the constraints of judicial review or due128
process. But the Court has not yet clearly delineated the limitations
the Constitution imposes, and the powers the Bush Administration
outside the territory of the United States, and claiming that a statute which interferes with this
authority would raise "substantial constitutional doubts," id. at 49.
126 President's Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Cer-
tain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (authoriz-
ing detention and military trial of an individual if the president finds there is "reason to believe
that such individual ... (i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida; (ii) has
engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in
preparation therefore ... ; or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or more" of such individuals);
see, e.g., Neal K. Kaytal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tri-
bunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (criticizing the military tribunal order); Comm. on Military
Affairs &Justice, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Inter Arna Silent Leges: In Times of
Armed Conflict, Should the Laws be Silent? (Dec. 2001) (reporting on the president's military order
of Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/Should%20the%2Laws%20be%20
Silent%204.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
127 Petitioner's Brief, Padilla (No. 03-1027). Indeed, in recent draft legislation (Patriot II),
the Ashcroft Justice Department has begun to seek authority to revoke the citizenship of indi-
viduals who engage in the activities of a group designated as a "terrorist organization," poten-
tially relegating even American citizens to the legal netherworld the administration purports to
construct for aliens. See Dep't of Justice, Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003: Section-
by-Section Analysis (depicting a confidential draft for Congress that was leaked to the Center
for Public Integrity), http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/downloads/Story_01_020703_
Doc.l.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2004). The Department of Justice has since distanced itself
from the Patriot 1I legislative proposal, but certain elements of the package are being pushed
through other proposals. See, e.g., Audrey Hudson, 'Patriot H' Bid Garners Little Favor on Hill,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at Al (quoting Sen. Leahy, saying that, "After all the criticism of
that sequel and the secretive way it was drafted, the administration now has decided to push a
sequel, without calling it a sequel.").
1 8 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (rejecting claim that separation of powers pre-
cluded relief for citizen captured on battlefield and detained without any due process); see id. at
2652 (Souter, J., & Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (stating
that executive detention is statutorily improper); id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., & Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that detention is unconstitutional in the absence of congressional suspension of habeas
corpus); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (holding that non-citizens detained in
Guantdnamo Bay may seek writs of habeas corpus); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2735
n.8 (2004) (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsberg, J., & Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that protracted
detention of non-citizens is illegal under statute).
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seeks would allow it to target inconvenient critics free of either judi-
cial review or public disclosure.
Of more current sobering concern is the use of the "material wit-
ness" authority. Let me begin by mentioning the plight of Osama
Awadallah who was arrested as a "material witness" in the aftermath
of September 11. He was not arrested because there was probable
cause to believe that he had committed any crime, but because the
Justice Department asserted that in the words of 18 U.S.C. § 3144 his
"testimony was material" in a grand jury proceeding. Mr. Awadallah
had known one of the September 11 hijackers a year before. He was
arrested, shackled for three days, and incarcerated incommunicado
for twenty-one days before it became clear that he in fact had no
connection to al Qaeda, after he answered several hundred questions
without immunity before a grand jury.2 9 At that point, he was
charged with perjury because at one point in his interrogation, he al-
legedly falsely stated that he "didn't know a Khalid," and denied writ-
ing a sentence containing the name "Khalid" in an examination
booklet.3 0 The trial court threw out his perjury prosecution on the
ground that the "material witness" statute was misused.13' On appeal,
the Second Circuit reinstated the prosecution and upheld the invoca-
tion of the material witness statute.
3 2
The main precedent invoked by the government was a case from
1971 in which a nineteen year old anti-war activist was grabbed off the
street by the Nixon-Mitchell Justice Department, on the eve of a ma-
jor demonstration in Washington, and dragged off to a grand jury in
Seattle as part of an eighty-four city, eleven hundred witness "investi-
gation" of the anti-war movement by the Justice Department's "Inter-
nal Security Division.' 3' The AshcroftJustice Department has not, as
far as has yet been disclosed, engaged in such wholesale harassment
of critics. But it claims the legal capacity to do so, as long as it is in-
vestigating any criminal offense.
In this context, the availability of databases correlating informa-
tion on the exercise of rights of dissent or nonconformism with other
data becomes particularly threatening. It appears that the recent er-
roneous incarceration of attorney Brandon Mayfield for two weeks
under the material witness statute stemmed from the fact that the
similarity of his fingerprint to a fingerprint connected to a terrorist
bombing appeared in juxtaposition with the facts that he had prayed
' United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
I d. at 59.
I Id. at 61.
"' United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 75 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 50, 54; Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971); see DONNER, supra note
24, at 365-68; Michael E. Deutsch, The Improper Use of the Federal Grand jury: An Instrument for the
Internment ofPoliticalActivists, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1159, 1181 (1984).
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at a mosque and had represented a suspected terrorist in a child cus-
tody proceeding. s4
Under current statutes, the conduct that constitutes a criminal of-
fense which can form the predicate for invocation of the "material
witness" provisions appears to cut an extraordinarily broad swath
across rights of free association. Current criminal statutes allow the
prosecution of individuals who "knowingly provide material support
or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempt[] or con-
spire to do so." 3 5 And Executive Order 13224 allows the seizure of
assets from persons determined by the secretary of the Treasury to as-
sist designated foreign persons who pose a risk of terrorism, or to be
"otherwise associated" with such persons. These are the statutes that
the Justice Department has invoked in its prosecution of so-called
"sleeper cells," based not on any violent conduct but on conspiracies
to give money or other "material support" to individuals or organiza-
tions that may engage in such conduct. The statutes extend to or-
ganizations that engage in both violent and nonviolent activities (like
the Irish Republican Army ("IRA") or the African National Congress
("ANC")), as well as foundations that may be "associated with" such
organizations.
Faced with such statutes, there is a strong incentive to steer clear
of controversial associations. The administration of the University of
California San Diego recently decided to forbid a student website
from linking to the website of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
lombia for fear that this might be construed as "providing material
134 According to one report,
Federal officials told Newsweek that they doubt Mayfield has been innocently swept up in
a case of international intrigue. Mayfield married an Egyptian woman and converted to
Islam 16 years ago. The couple was active in a local Oregon mosque whose members
had openly protested government antiterror policies... [and] in 2002 Mayfield had vol-
unteered to provide legal help [in a child custody matter] for Jeffrey Battle, one of the
ringleaders of the Portland Seven-a group of local jihadists who had flown to Asia after
9/11 in an unsuccessful effort to fight with the Taliban."
Michael Isikoff, An American Connection, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/
4933790/; see also Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Bomb Case Against Lawyer Is Rejected, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2004, at A16; Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Spain Had Doubts Before U.S. Held
Lawyer in Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at Al.
... 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2002). In Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Department ofJustice,
352 F.3d 382, 405 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that to convict for a violation of sec-
tion 2339B, the government "must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew that
the organization was designated as a foreign terrorist organization or that the accused knew of
the organization's unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated." The court also con-
cluded that portions of the statutory definition of "material support" were void for vagueness.
Id. Even though the court subsequently vacated its opinion and granted the government's peti-
tion for rehearing en banc, 1umanitarian Law Project, 382 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), Congress is
considering legislation that would both implement the Ninth Circuit's knowledge requirement
and clarify the definition of "material support." See H.R. 10, 108th Cong. § 2043(2004).
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support," but backed off in the face of protests. 36 That incident is,
perhaps, amusing but especially combined with the "material witness"
power claimed by the Justice Department, matters may get deadly se-
rious in short order.
Mosques challenging federal surveillance powers report substan-
tial declines in attendance and religiously mandated contributions,
13 7
and the Justice Department's "material support" prosecutions include
a recent action against a computer science student, Sami Omar al-
Hussayen for maintaining websites which contained Islamist writing-
a prosecution which only ran aground on the common sense of an
Idaho jury.138 The breadth of the "material support" statute has led
some courts to hold parts of it to be unconstitutional, but these de-
terminations are on appeal.
13 9
For non-citizen residents of the United States, the threat of re-
taliation is even more foreboding. In the backwash of September 11,
the administration rounded up over one thousand men of near east-
ern origin, held them for an extended time period, and deported
most of them, notwithstanding the absence in many cases of any sub-
stantial connection with terrorist threats. 140 The USA PATRIOT Act
makes even unknowing association with terrorists a deportable of-
fense, and allows the attorney general to order detention of aliens
without any prior showing or court ruling that the person is danger-
' Declan McCullagh, University Backs Down on Link Ban, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 8, 2002, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-961297.html.
... Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 8, Muslim Cmty. Ass'n of Ann
Arbor v. Ashcroft (E.D. Mich. 2003) (No. 03-72913), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files/
OpenFile.cfm?id=14305.
" See, e.g., Bob Fick, Trial Merges Terror Charges, Free Speech, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 2004
(quoting a prosecutor alleging that "Al-Hussayen provided the linkage to create the platform
and then the content to advocate extreme jihad"), available at http://www.boston.com/news/
nation/articles/2004/05/28/trial_merges terrorchargesfreespeech/; Richard B. Schmitt,
Free Speech Crux of Terrorism Case: Sami Omar Al-Hussayen 's Lawyers Say He Was Trying to Foster Dia-
logue on His Fatwa-filled Websites, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at A25 (recounting prosecution of
computer scientist who helped design websites containing Islamist writings under "material
support" statute). Apparently Mr. A1-Hussayen is also charged with "failing to list all profes-
sional, social and charitable institutions to which [he] belongs." Dahlia Lithwick, I, Visa, SLATE
MAGAZINE, May 12, 2004. Although acquitted on the terrorism charges, AI-Hussayen agreed to
be deported in exchange for the remaining immigration charges against him being dropped.
Betsy Z. Russell, Feds Drop Remaining Charges Against Al-Hussayen, SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane,
Wash.),June 30, 2004.
'" Humanitarian Law Project v. Dep't ofJustice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring spe-
cific intent to further terrorist aims and holding prohibition of providing "training" and "per-
sonnel" to be impermissibly vague); Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d
1185 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding prohibition of provision of "expert advice or assistance" to be
impermissibly vague).
10 E.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OFJUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A
REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION qTH
THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 1I ATTACKS (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
oig/special/0306/full.pdf; David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 961 (2002).
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ous where he "has reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is en-
gaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the
United States. 1 4 ' And the administration claims the right to choose
political bases to deport non-citizens for immigration violations, no
matter how trivial, at its sole discretion.
14
1
Surveillance and data banks carry as well the prospect of other
sanctions. Both citizens and aliens face the prospect of potential ex-
clusion from air travel if they appear on governmentally disseminated
"no fly lists" or "watch lists" or if their characteristics or associations
trigger scrutiny. 11 The dissemination of watch lists to both public
and private sectors can, in turn, generate a variety of other con-
straints, as recipients exercise discretion over the allocation of oppor-
tunities and benefits. 144 And, having become the focus of attention by
virtue of appearance on a watch list disseminated to law enforcement
officers, officers are free to use collateral criminal violations, no mat-
ter how minor, as the predicate for searches or prosecution. 1 45 In the
141 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411, 115 Stat. 272, 345-50 (2001) (association);
id. § 412, 115 Stat. at 350-52 (detention for up to six months).
"' See Reno v. Am. Arab Antidiscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) ("[A]n alien
unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a de-
fense against his deportation."). The fate of the "L.A. 8," a group of Arab community organiz-
ers originally accused of advocating world communism under a now-repealed statute, which was
at issue in Reno remains unresolved, and it appears two of the eight might now face deportation
under the USA PATRIOT Act for fundraising and distribution of literature that was legal at the
time it occurred. See Editorial, Drop This Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2003, at A28 (detailing pro-
posed deportation for having held fundraising events and rallies and having distributed maga-
zines between 1984 and 1986).
", E.g., Ann Davis, Post-Sept. 11 Watchlist Acquires Life of its Own, WALL ST.J., Nov. 19, 2002, at
1 (describing wide circulation and collateral consequences of FBI watch lists of suspected "ter-
rorists"); Sara Kehaulani Goo, ACLUFiles Suit Over 'No-Ry'List, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2004, at A3;
Adam Liptak, A. C.L. U. to Withdraw from Charity Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004 (describing certi-
fication required of federal employee charities that they would not knowingly employ people
whose names appeared on several government terrorism watch lists), http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/08/01/politics/Olaclu.html; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-03-332,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: TERRORIST WATCH LISTS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO PROMOTE
BETTER INTEGRATION AND SHARING (2003) (describing the problem of multiple watchlists with
little supervisory control), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03322.pdf.
... Ryan Singel, Data Scant for Watchlist Usage, WIRED NEWS, May 17, 2004 (describing 120,000
person "watch list" produced by the "Terrorism Screening Center," available to highway patrol
officers, airline screeners, and border control officials), at http://www.wired.com/news/
privacy/0,1848,63478,00.html; Guy Taylor, FBI Up for Private Screens, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004
(recounting FBI and DHS plan to develop databases that will allow private companies to submit
lists of individuals to be screened for connections with terrorism). In addition, the USA
PATRIOT Act obliges banks and other financial institutions to verify the identity of their cus-
tomers and check those identities against government-provided watch lists. USA PATRIOT Act
§ 312(a), 115 Stat. at 304-05 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i)).
"' Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that custodial arrest for viola-
tion of seatbelt statute does not violate Fourth Amendment); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769
(2001); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (subjective basis for search is constitution-
ally irrelevant if probable cause is present).
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wake of September 11, the Attorney General announced an intention
to use minor charges against those he suspects of being linked to ter-
rorism where proof of more substantive violations is unavailable;
46
there is no reason to believe that local officials will be less aggressive.
The potential impact of dossiers and watch lists on dissent and
free expression is shadowed by the risks that the lists may be politi-
cized. In gathering data, the FBI has chosen to monitor political
demonstrations through its terrorism notification system,147 and has
specifically refused the advice of the Justice Department's Inspector
General to disentangle its terrorist surveillance from surveillance of
political protest. 4 The prospect of an FBI dossier alone may well be
sufficient to deter non-citizens, applicants for government jobs, or
those who seek to avoid entanglement as material witnesses from par-
ticipating in dissenting activity.
Conversely, there has been at least one high profile effort by Re-
publican legislators to use anti-terrorism surveillance data for partisan
"6 U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors Conference
(Oct. 25, 2001) ("Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest mobsters for
,spitting on the sidewalk' if it would help in the battle against organized crime. It has been and
will be the policy of this Department of Justice to use the same aggressive arrest and detention
tactics in the war on terror."), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks
10_25.htn; U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft
House Select Committee on Homeland Security (July 11, 2002) ("The Justice Department of
Robert F. Kennedy, it was said, would arrest a mobster for spitting on the sidewalk if it would
help in the fight against organized crime. In the war on terror, it has been the policy of this
Department of Justice to be equally aggressive."), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2002/
071102agtestimony.htm.
... See, e.g., Karen Abbott, Warnings Precede Party Conventions, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 24, 2004
(describing FBI questioning twenty-one year old American Friend Service Committee intern at
her home as part of investigation of "protestors and anarchists" by "Joint Terrorism Task Force,"
and threats to "use more intrusive efforts"). Compare FBI Response to Media Misinterpretation
of its Law Enforcement Sensitive Intelligence Bulletin (Oct. 15, 2003) (claiming that the FBI
does not surveil protestors, but including "Law Enforcement Sensitive Intelligence Bulletin"
describing, inter alia the fact that "[p]rotestors often use the internet to recruit, raise funds, and
coordinate their activities prior to demonstrations" and directing that "[flaw enforcement
agencies should be alert to these possible indicators of protest activity and report any potentially
illegal acts to the nearest FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force."), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
response.htm, with Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Scrutinizes Antiwar Rallies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at
Al (detailing FBI monitoring of protest activity).
4 The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice recommended "trans-
ferring responsibility for investigating crimes committed by environmental, animal rights, and
other domestic radical groups or individuals from the Counterterrorism Division to the Crimi-
nal Investigative Division." OIG, FBI's EFFORTS, supra note 9, at 50. The FBI refused, id. at 90-
98 app.8. The Inspector General reiterated its belief that "the FBI's priority mission to prevent
high-consequence terrorist acts would be enhanced if the Counterterrorism Division did not
have to spend time and resources on lower-threat activities by social protestors or on crimes
committed by environmental, animal rights, and other domestic radical groups or individuals."
Id. at 94. More details might well be contained in "Appendix 6" of the audit report, entitled
"Potential for Criminal Activity at Antiwar Protests," but that appendix was redacted.
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purposes.'49 Although the FAA has issued a rule limiting release of
the precise data involved in this case,"" it is far from clear that all sur-
veillance data is similarly protected, or that the nominal protections
would be effective in the face of determined efforts to seek retalia-
tion.15 1 If I were an orthodoxJew, which I am not, who frequented rib
joints surreptitiously, which I do not, I might well think twice before
crossing an FBI agent with desktop access to my credit card receipts.
III. "GOOD FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS":
HEDGES AGAINST REPRESSION
The limits imposed on domestic intelligence during the 1970s
were in part, it must be acknowledged, a sort of willful blindness.
They existed in tension both with bureaucratic imperatives and the
apparent demands of the effort to protect our country from terrorist
attacks. As Pyle points out, a bureaucrat is far more likely to be disci-
plined for not knowing information his superior desires than for col-
lecting too much information. 52  And in the aftermath of September
11 the danger is not simply one to career advancement but the threat
of physical catastrophe.
I have long maintained that negative examples play an important
role in constitutional analysis: it is easier to identify and achieve con-
sensus on the evils to be avoided than on the good to be attained,
since goods are often plural and inconsistent. Likewise, it is often
easier to reverse engineer legal doctrine if one has a clear idea about
the threats it seeks to counter. The abuses of the 1970s played the
role of legal landmark in much thinking about intelligence oversight
before September 11. Today, we are often tempted to replace that
49 See David Jackson, Homeland Security Agency Says It Spent 40 Minutes on Search for Dems,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 17, 2003, at 3A; R. Jeffrey Smith, In Texas Feud, A Plane Tale of In-
trigue; U.S. Role in GOP Hunt for Democratic Lawmakers Is Still Murky, WASH. POST, June 7, 2003, at
Al (detailing efforts by staff of House Rep. Tom Delay to use resources of the Justice Depart-
ment, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Homeland Security to track
down Democratic state legislators whose absence was blocking a Republican redistricting plan
in Texas).
' R. Jeffrey Smith, FAA Sets New Rules After Flap Over Search, WASH. POST, July 16, 2003, at
A21.
"' Criminal prohibitions on disclosure of the identity of CIA operatives famously failed to
deter the leaking of the identity Valerie Plame as retaliation for the report by her husband Jo-
seph Wilson that cast doubt on administrative claims about the Iraqi nuclear program. E.g.,
Richard B. Schmitt, Ex-Diplomat Whose Wife Was Outed at CIA Is Next to Throw Book at Bush, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at All; see alsoJoseph Wilson, Meet the Press Interview, May 2, 2004 ("I
mention in the book that there are also reports from journalists back to me that they're fearful
of writing these stories. One journalist said because he was afraid he would end up in Guan-
tnamo.... Another one said that, of course, they had two children in private schools and a
mortgage."), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4880116.
" PYLE, supra note 21, at 391.
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landmark with the crater of ground zero: whatever else we must
achieve, we are told, we must avoid another September 11.
This presentation of the issue, however, rests on a false dichot-
omy. One way to "avoid September 11" is to ground all airplanes.
One way to avoid forty-three thousand deaths a year would be to
abandon auto travel. Yet, of course, our country chooses to do nei-
ther. The real issue is whether the reduction in threat is worth the
potential cost to constitutional liberty.
As a civil liberties lawyer, evaluating the security benefits of uncon-
trolled domestic surveillance and data mining exceeds my core com-
petence, though I would note in passing that the emerging programs
are not without their tough-minded and knowledgeable 
critics.15 3
Rather, having adumbrated some of the costs in political freedom
that inhere in uncontrolled surveillance and data mining, I turn now
to a few proposals on how those costs might be mitigated, in a fashion
reasonably consistent with the need to build a domestic system to
deal with the threat of terrorist assaults.
A. "The Former Can Hold No Terror": Substantive Legal Protection
Responding to concerns about the effect that government de-
ployment of information might have on constitutional rights a gen-
eration ago, then-Judge Scalia commented:
The line of permissibility, we think, falls not between criticism of ideas in
general and criticism of the ideas contained in specific books or ex-
pressed by specific persons; but rather between the disparagement of
ideas (general or specific) and the suppression of ideas through the ex-
ercise or threat of state power. If the latter is rigorously proscribed...
the former can hold no terror.154
"' For example, security expert Bruce Schneier argues that when one takes into account the
cost of false alarms, the diversion of attention, and the prospect of terrorists attempting to game
the system, data mining and data warehousing are likely to decrease rather than increase secu-
rity on balance. BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR 164-65 (2003) (critiquing CAPPS II); id. at
188-90 (critiquing data mining to find terrorists); id. at 253-54 (critiquing TIA). Moreover, if
we seek cooperation of local immigrant communities, there must be some assurance that the
information they submit will not be misused. Current broad and confrontational policies
probably make this unlikely; in the medium run, avoiding broad public backlash will depend on
assuring the public that abuses are not occurring. See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL
ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR 256-57 (2004) ("To protect our civil liberties and
defeat the terrorists, we need to be careful not to do things that create a popular backlash
against security measures. As the widespread opposition to the unfortunately named Patriot Act
proves, Attorney General Ashcroft has not managed that balancing act.").
" Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J); cf Steven Pfaff, The Limits
of Coercive Surveillance: Social and Penal Control in the German Democratic Republic, 3 PUNISHMENT &
Soc'Y 381, 394-95 (2001) (describing the effectiveness of the GDR Stasi as based on the combi-
nation of surveillance with the power of arbitrary arrest, blackmail, "systematic discrediting,"
and the "haunting fear that you could be arrested anytime .... the Stasi... knew everything");
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But the converse is also true. If prophylactic constraints on the ac-
quisition and dissemination of information within the government
are loosened, direct protections against the abuse of that information
need to be strengthened. To the extent that government officials can
single out dissenters more easily for adverse treatment, protection of
dissent requires stronger substantive and procedural constraints on
the capacity of the officials to administer that treatment. This insight
suggests several implications.
First, as transparency increases, the increased danger of retaliation
against constitutionally protected activities should bring with it
heightened scrutiny of the exercise of government discretion. At the
level of substance, the Court's commitment to the prohibition of un-
constitutional conditions becomes increasingly important."' At the
level of procedure, the heightened danger of covert unconstitutional
retaliation should bring with it more rigorous regard for the de-
mands of notice and hearing before the government imposes disad-
vantages on the basis of shared information-whether those disad-
vantages consist of placement on "no fly lists" or deportation. The
vast increase in the availability of information regarding individuals
will make it ever easier to develop purportedly neutral profiles that in
fact and in intent focus disadvantages on disfavored political, reli-
gious, or ethnic groups. This potential manipulation should gener-
ate more willingness to investigate the reasons for exercises of discre-
tion when they are challenged .
In a world of increased informational interpenetration, transpar-
ency should run in both directions. If government officials are better
William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1077
(1995) (arguing that "the problem is not information gathering but violence").
'5 As the Court explained in United States v. American Library Ass'n: "Under this doctrine 'the
government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected ... freedom of speech" even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.'" 539 U.S. 194,
210 (2003) (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)); see, e.g.,
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001); O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716-18 (1996).
A doctrine that took this phenomenon into account would rethink: (1) the proof re-
quirements for selective prosecution claims, see Reno v. Arab Am. Antidiscrimination Comm.,
525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that an alien cannot bring a claim for selective enforcement in
deportation proceedings); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996) (allowing de-
fendants to access government documents to prepare for the defense to the case in chief, but
not for the defense of selective prosecution); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-8 (1985)
(holding that for selective prosecution claim the petitioner bears the burden to show that the
government intended to unlawfully discriminate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause);
(2) the permission of pretextual searches, see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001);
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("[S]ubjective intentions 'of the law enforce-
ment officer' play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."); and (3)
the doctrine of Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1991) (upholding practice of strik-
ing Spanish speaking jurors on the theory that hostility towards those who speak Spanish is not
animus toward Hispanics).
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able to obtain information to target constitutionally protected activi-
ties in the exercise of their discretion, it becomes more imperative
that discretion should itself be exercised in a setting where the politi-
cal limits on abuse can be brought to bear. As Judge Keith ob-
served-a generation after rejecting the Nixon Administration's
claim to extraconstitutional power-"Democracies die behind closed
doors. The First Amendment, through a free press, protects the peo-
ple's right to know that their government acts fairly, lawfully, and ac-
curately."17
B. Designing for Dissent:
Structuring Information Systems to Minimize Abuse
Laws do not enforce themselves; still less do they enforce them-
selves with perfect efficacy. Whatever the level of substantive protec-
tion against abuse provided by law "on the books," the removal of
prophylactic constraints on information sharing will, ceteris paribus,
make abuse more likely. The challenge of a well-designed system of
information sharing is to adopt procedures that counteract this in-
crease in risk without degrading the nation's capacity to deal with ter-
rorism. What follows is far from an exhaustive analysis. Rather, I ex-
plore briefly several mechanisms that make use of informational
techniques to counterbalance informational dangers.
1. Access Controls: Selective Revelation,
Rule Processing Technology, DRM, Anonymization
Traditional security practices in the intelligence community have
emphasized a "need to know" principle. Information is disseminated
on a selective basis, and often the originator of the information re-
tains control over its use, in order to assure that classified sources of
'57 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002). Contra N. Jersey Media
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that the Attorney General
can order blanket closure of immigration hearings to the media and the public). In this re-
gard, the Supreme Court's decision to deny review in M.K.B. v. Warden, 124 S. Ct. 1405 (2004),
a case which upheld the sealing of a habeas corpus application by an immigrant who was se-
cretly imprisoned as a "material witness" for five months in the roundups following September
11, is particularly disturbing. Mohamed Kamel Bellahouel was imprisoned on the basis of FBI
affidavits that he "'likely' served meals to two of the Sept. 11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Mar-
wan al Shehhi, while waiting tables at a Middle Eastern restaurant in Delray Beach, Fla." and
reportedly "was seen entering a movie theater with a third Sept. 11 hijacker, Ahmed Alnami."
James McLaughlin, Blackout of Justice, 28 NEWS MEDIA & LAW 7 (Winter 2004), http://
ww.rcfp.org/news/mag/28-1/cov-blackout.html. All proceedings in Bellahouel's application
for a writ of habeas corpus were sealed, notwithstanding the fact that he was later released. Id.
The Court allowed all briefs to be filed under seal, so it is difficult to determine the basis, if any,
for the determination.
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information are not disclosed. The risk of abuse is minimized by
limiting access to sensitive information. In structure, the problem of
privacy and misuse of databases to suppress dissent is cognate: the
challenge is to prevent misuse of data, and the more selectively data is
disseminated, the less likely it will be to be misused. Conceptually,
there is no reason that the mechanisms that have been developed to
limit dissemination of classified data cannot equally be deployed to
limit misuse of intimate or politically sensitive information.
Existing approaches to multilevel relations in the context of multi-
level secure databases allow only users with appropriate security
clearances access to classified data. Technologists are currently ex-
ploring sophisticated databases which provide fine grained selective
access to the materials contained in data networks, based on their
privacy and sensitivity; these mechanisms can ensure thatparticular
searchers are entitled to view only particular bits of data.' 6 Thus, a
domestic security database could be constructed that allows general
access, for example, to a subject's address, but access to her gun own-
ership records only to one group of analysts, and access to her atten-
dance at political rallies only to another select group. Other tech-
nologies could prevent analysts from exporting data from their
computers to any other computer not similarly authorized, allowing
privacy classifications to "stick to" the data as it is shared.1
61
"' For example, the Office of the Inspector General described the current classification sys-
tem:
According to one FBI Section Chief, the FBI does not originate 90 percent of the intelli-
gence it uses. The agency that originally collected the intelligence may mark it ORCON,
or originator controlled. All agencies that receive this information must receive permis-
sion from the originating agency before further dissemination. Agencies usually mark a
document ORCON for two reasons. First, it allows the originating agency to protect the
sources and methods disclosed in the classified document. Second, it is a vehicle to al-
low the originating agency to control how the information or conclusions in a document
are used.
OIG, FBI's EFFORTS, supra note 9, at 15; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OFJUSTICE, A
REVIEW OF THE FBI's PERFORMANCE IN DETERRING, DETECTING, AND INVESTIGATING THE
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN 23 (2003) [hereinafter OIG, HANSSEN]
(criticizing the FBI for failure to enforce "need to know" requirements, thereby facilitating es-
pionage by a member of the FBI), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0308/
final.pdf.
"' See, e.g., Chris Strohm, Homeland Security Privacy Officer Pushes Training Efforts,
GOVEXEC.COM, Nov. 17, 2003 ("[T]he Customs and Border Protection Agency .... uses tech-
nology that limits the number of employees who can access sensitive information, as well as the
time that information can be viewed."), at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1103/
111703cl.htm.
60 E.g., RAKESH AGRAWAL ET AL., HIPPOCRATIC DATABASES 2 (2002) (noting that ongoing
work of particular interest concerns access control policies), available at http://
www.almaden.ibm.com/cs/people/srikant/papers/vldb02.pdf.
... E.g., MARCO CASASSA MONT ET AL., TOWARDS ACCOUNTABLE MANAGEMENT OF IDENTITY
AND PRIVACY: STICKY POLICIES AND ENFORCEABLE TRACING SERVICES 4-6 (2003) (proposing a
model that employs sticky privacy policies to increase data receivers accountability in e-
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Researchers have begun, as well, to generate methods of search-
ing distributed databases that technologically embed limits on access
to particular types of data in the search process itself,16 and methods
that allow data mining for trends across a variety of databases, while
masking the particular attributes of individual members of the popu-
lation searched, and preventing the holders of data from determin-
ing the nature and purpose of the search. 16  A variety of commenta-
tors have suggested that national security data mining make use of
these technologies to limit examination information about innocent
individuals.164  Indeed, the ill-fated TIA program itself contemplated
developing a "privacy appliance" to assure that searches did not ex-
tend beyond proper limits. 65
The difficulty with this approach is twofold. First many of the
agencies which gather and share information under the post-
September 11 security regime are far from the cutting edge of tech-
commerce transactions), available at http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2003/HPL-2003-
49.html; IBM, Enterprise Privacy Technologies (describing systems utilizing "'sticky policy para-
digm' mandates that policy sticks to the data, travels with it, and can be used to decide how the
data can be used."), at http://www.zurich.ibm.com/security/enterprise-privacy/ (last visited
Sept. 30, 2004); cf Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 575 (2003)
(giving an account of mechanisms of "digital rights management" that also reveal the activities
of users of information).
62 E.g., MAYANK BAWA ET AL., PRIVACY PRESERVING INDEXING OF DOCUMENTS ON THE
NETWORK 11 (2003) (describing research on the problem of "private information retrieval"
where "[a] user wishes to privately retrieve the i-th bit from a database, without revealing any
information about i"), available at http://www.almaden.ibm.com/software/quest/Publications/
papers/vldb03-ppi.pdf.
60 E.g., Alexandre Evfimievski et al., Limiting Privacy Breaches in Privacy Preserving Data Mining,
(2003), available at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/aevf/research/PODS_- 2003.pdf; Latanya
Sweeney, Achieving k-Anonymity Privacy Protection Using Generalization and Suppression, 10 INT'LJ.
ON UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS, & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 571 (2002), available at
http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/people/sweeney/kanonymity2.pdf. For a bibliography, see Pri-
vacy-Preserving Data Mining, at http://www.tcs.hut.fi/-helger/crypto/link/data-mining (last
visited Sept. 30, 2004).
' E.g., JAMES X. DEMPSEY & PAUL ROSENZWEIG, CMR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.,
TECHNOLOGIES THAT CAN PROTECT PRIVACY AS INFORMATION IS SHARED TO COMBAT TERRORISM
15 (2004) (noting that techniques to anonymize data are still in their infancy), available at
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040526technologies.pdf; MARKLE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 34 (calling for the use of anonymizing techniques for searching to minimize the pri-
vacy impact); TAPAC REPORT, supra note 5, at ix, x, 50-51 (recommending data anonymiza-
tion); Taipale, supra note 122, at 74 (arguing that "rule-based processing and a distributed database
architecture can significantly ameliorate the general data aggregation problem by limiting the
scope of inquiry and the subsequent processing and use of data within policy guidelines" and
that "selective revelation can reduce the non-particularized suspicion problem, by requiring an
articulated particularized suspicion and intervention of a judicial procedure before identity is
revealed").
"' E.g., Matthew Fordahl, Device Will Watch Over the Watchers, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt
Lake City, Utah), July 21, 2003, at C2; Leslie Walker, Balancing Data Needs and Privacy, WASH.
POST, May 8, 2003, at El (describing research conducted by Teresa Lunt at the Palo Alto Re-
search Center who received a grant to develop a "privacy appliance" for TIA).
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nology. The theoretical availability of a "privacy appliance," "sticky"
privacy policies, or privacy preserving data mining is likely to be ir-
relevant to police forces that operate with card files, or an FBI struc-
ture that is struggling to bring its computer system up to minimum
levels of effectiveness. Equally important, once a piece of informa-
tion leaves the digital environment, its technological classification
vanishes. An official who seeks to avoid technological access controls
need only transcribe and convey the material by more traditional
166means.
Second, privacy classifications exist at the discretion of the classifi-
ers and a "privacy appliance" can be turned off or turned down as
easily as it can be turned on. If the programmers of the "appliance"
quarantine data about attendance at political rallies, but not religious
services, only political privacy is protected. Even if administrators act
in the best of faith, simply identifying the scope of data that may be
used to track dissenters is no easy task. Conversely, it is difficult ex
ante to know what information might prove useful in seeking to un-
cover potential perpetrators of terrorist outrages. Queries might
plausibly seek to identify suspects who shared an apartment with a
known terrorist. But they might equally inquire into whether the
suspect shared a mosque, a friend, or a tendency to visit certain web-
sites or bulletin boards, where coded messages might have been
left. 67 Given the history of domestic surveillance it is more than pos-
sible to imagine administrators who make efforts to tweak the "pri-
vacy appliance" in a fashion that minimizes interference with their
opportunity to suppress "subversion."
Like traditional "need to know" security, the privacy protection
mechanisms are at odds with the premise of post-September 11 in-
formation sharing. The common wisdom-warranted or not-is that
it is precisely the limits on sharing of information which stands in the
way of effective antiterrorist intelligence, and policies which stand di-
rectly in the way of sharing are unlikely to prove durable. To take
For example:
The practice of collecting vast amounts of information on American citizens was termi-
nated in 1971, when new Department of Defense restrictions came into effect calling for
the destruction of all files on 'unaffiliated' persons, and organizations. Rather than de-
stroying the files, however, several Army intelligence units simply turned their intelli-
gence files and dissident individuals and groups over to local police authorities; and one
Air Force counterintelligence unit in San Diego began to create new files the next year.
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 1297
(1971).
67 Cf Thomas C. Greene, Al-Qaeda Said to Be Using Stegged Porn, REGISTER, May 12, 2003 (re-
porting and purporting to debunk claim that al Qaeda members left secret messages embedded
in pornographic photographs on Internet bulletin boards), at http://
www.theregister.co.uk/2003/05/12/alqaedasaid-to-be-using. More reputable analysts seem
to believe that al Qaeda uses coded messages in mundane e-mail and instant message format.
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one example, even as the FBI was recovering from the damage
wrought by turncoat Robert Hansen, who had gathered and stolen
enormous amounts of data by utilizing queries in the FBI's "Auto-
mated Case Support" system, FBI headquarters removed access con-
trols to that system as a means of facilitating "sharing" of data for the
war on terrorism.168  It seems unlikely that decision makers would
prove more solicitous in their protection of personal information of
dissenters.
2. Audit Trails
If implementation of technological limits on access to personally
identifiable data is likely to run aground on the "need to share" intel-
ligence, another measure which does not interfere prospectively with
sharing may prove more feasible. In any sort of environment where
abuse is a possibility, the abuse becomes less likely when it is more
subject to discovery. Thus, it was common before September 11 for
information systems to mandate non-falsifiable or tamper resistant
audit trails that would, on inspection, reveal the use to which infor-
mation was put.'69 With the emergence of the "need to share," these
safeguards become still more salient. A series of analyses addressing
the emerging issues of data mining and aggregation in the current
intelligence climate have similarly called for the adoption of strong
audit trails for analyses and dissemination of personally identifiable
data. 170
' See COMM'N FOR REVIEW OF FBI SEC. PROGRAMs, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF FBI
SECURITY PROGRAMS 46-48 (2002) (describing the abandonment of "need to know" access
which facilitates the repeat of the Hanssen debacle), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
05publications/websterreport.pdf. The FBI will presumably respond to this concern in future
efforts.
1 E.g., id. at 38-41 (describing discovery of misuse of FBI Automated Case Support system by
Robert Hanssen through review of audit logs); 28 C.F.R. § 23.20(g) (mandating that "a project
maintaining criminal intelligence information shall ensure that administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards (including audit trails) are adopted to insure against unauthorized access
and against intentional or unintentional damage. A record indicating who has been given in-
formation, the reason for release of the information, and the date of each dissemination out-
side the project shall be kept"); id. § 23.20(g) (3) ("The project must store information in the
system in a manner such that it cannot be modified, destroyed, accessed, or purged without au-
thorization."); cf MATRIX, PRIVACY POLICY § 8 (2003) (purporting to require log of access and
dissemination of information), available at http://www.matrix-at.org/privacy-policy.pdf.
,7 E.g., MARKLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 15; TAPAC REPORT, supra note 5, at ix-x; Arthur J.
Cockfield, Who Watches the Watchers? A Law and Technology Perspective on Government and Private
Sector Surveillance, 29 QUEEN'S L.J. 364, 378 (2003); Dempsey & Rosenzweig, supra note 164, at
13; Taipale, supra note 122, at 75 (calling for mitigation of abuse by use of "strong credential
and audit features and diversifying authorization and oversight"); A. Michael Froomkin, The
Uneasy Case for National ID Cards 46-48 (Mar. 2004) (draft), http://personal.law.miami.edu/
-froomkin/articles/ID 1.pdf.
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Audit trails of both queries and dissemination of data do not in-
terfere with data sharing, but can mitigate its dangers. At a mini-
mum, audit trails allow the organizational hierarchy to know what use
is being made of sensitive data and data mining capabilities. Effective
and available query logging and audit trails limit the possibility that
rogue members of the intelligence community will embark on free-
lance surveillance of dissidents or invasions of privacy. 17' They allow
organizations to track whether their own rules are being flouted, a
capability as important for maintaining security as for maintaining
privacy. Privacy officers can use audit trails as a basis for increased
training where appropriate. Audit trails available to internal inspec-
tors general and potentially to criminal prosecutors or injured citi-
zens provide some deterrence of blatantly illegal inquiries. Should
illegal releases of data occur, audit trails provide the capacity to track
the release back to the source.
Audit trails (especially combined with "sticky" data tags which lay
down trails as the data is disseminated) can allow corrected data to
follow inquiries through the system when data or analyses prove to be• 173 -
inaccurate. At a more advanced level, at least one proposed system
would, as a part of intelligence analysis, monitor, the inquiries of ana-
lysts in real time. 174 Such a system could monitor the accuracy of the
results of queries and could also be keyed to alert supervisors to po-
litically based or otherwise improper data analysis. 1
75
To be sure, like access control technologies, audit trails are tech-
nology dependent. They will be less useful in less technologically so-
phisticated environments and can be evaded to some extent by mov-
171 In the 1970s, it appeared that parts of the military hierarchy were as surprised as civilians
at the breadth and depth of domestic surveillance undertaken at the ground level. See PYLE,
supra note 21. In recent months, it has appeared that our Homeland Security bureaucracy may
be equally ill informed. See Ryan Singel, Senators Question TSA Denials, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 15,
2004 (detailing eight months of denials by TSA officials, Admiral Loy, and Privacy Officer
O'Connor Kelly that CAPPS II had been tested on actual passenger data, when in fact three air-
lines had provided millions of passenger records that had been subject to testing), at
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,63067,00.html.
12 OIG, HANSSEN, supra note 158, at 23 (advocating tracking of high security documents and
real time auditing of inquiries). The FBI does occasionally catch and punish illegal access to its
system by reviewing its logs. See Bill Braithwaite & Steven S. Lazarus, Markle Found. Connecting
for Health Initiative-Advanced HIPPA Privacy & Security Case Studies (June 6, 2003) (setting
forth case studies of privacy auditing in HMOs), http://cpane.cygnusnet.com/-ehcca/
presentations/HIPAAWest3/braithwaite_lazarus.pdf; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, FBI Legal
Technician Pleads Guilty to Unlawfully Accessing the FBI's Computer System (Feb. 26, 2004)
(available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/February/04_crm-120.htm).
"3 MARKLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 36.
,74 ARDA, supra note 16 (describing system that "attempt[s] to induce as much of this infor-
mation as possible from what the analyst does during the analytic process").
75 Cf. RAKESH AGRAWAL ET AL., AUDITING COMPLIANCE WITH A HIPPOCRATIC DATABASE 7
(2004) (discussing the development of a query intrusion detector), available at
http://www.almaden.ibm.com/software/quest/Publications/papers/vldb04_audit.pdf.
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ing outside of digital dissemination. But the most threatening data
mining is itself effective only in the use of advanced computer tech-
nology, and even partial trails are useful as clues to track disclosures
that end outside of the digital environment.
Unlike privacy enhancing or access limiting technologies, audit
trails are likely to be well integrated with the security demands of
most large scale data systems. The precise nature of the sensitive
data, moreover, need not be identified ex ante. Investigators seeking
to uncover abuses can themselves mine audit logs for patterns of po-
tential harassment identified after the fact.
3. Watching the Watchers
Audit trails, however, can serve deterrent or restorative functions
only if they are utilized; an unexamined log is hardly worth having.
The institutional environment in which the records of surveillance
are reviewed is crucial in any effort to construct a system that is con-
sistent with civil liberty.
One audience for information regarding the use of surveillance is
internal. Most intelligence agencies have their own inspectors gen-
eral, or intelligence oversight officers and the Department of Home-
land Security was equipped with both a Privacy Officer and a Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties Officer. To the extent that these internal
agents have the inclination and capacity, the prospect of their exami-
nation will have a salutary impact on the way in which sensitive data is
analyzed and disseminated. There is reason to wonder, however,
whether such officers are likely to be sufficiently funded or motivated
in most cases.
More active analysis of the way in which internal surveillance is
undertaken is likely to come from external watchdogs. Congress,
through intelligence oversight committees, GAO investigations, and
demands of individual members has had some impact on the "war on
terror" thus far. Much of the information on internal security exer-
cises since September 11 has come in response to such congressional
inquiries, and it is important that audit logs be available for inspec-
tion by the legislative branch.
Still more public oversight of domestic surveillance since Septem-
ber 1 1 has been generated by advocates external to government in-
voking the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") ,76 and potentially
"76 See, e.g., Press Release, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Lawsuit Seeks Information
on Law Enforcement Agency Purchases of "Profiling" Data (Jan. 15, 2002) ("EPIC charged that
the Departments ofJustice and Treasury have violated the law by failing to respond to a series of
Freedom of Information Act (FO1A) requests ... ."), http://www.epic.org/privacy/litigation/
profilingpr.html; ACLU, Patriot FOIA ("[T]he ACLU and other public interest organizations
have filed two requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking records relating
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by discovery in other litigation. 7 7 In the normal course of events, the
executive branch can be expected to oppose outside efforts to dis-
cover information regarding surveillance; indeed the current admini-
stration has adamantly resisted FOIA requests and has sought to
block any public inquiry into its initiatives. r 8 This approach is short-
sighted.
If the goal is simply to maximize surveillance in the short run, of
course, disclosure may be viewed as counterproductive, for it allows
political opponents of surveillance to gain traction. Yet, ultimately in
the 1970s it was the surreptitious quality of the surveillance that led to
its delegitimation; programs that are openly avowed are likely to gar-
ner more long run support. A showing of the discretion with which
they are used and the accuracy of their results is likely to allay, rather
than exacerbate concerns.
The more persuasive response to the demand for disclosure is
likely to rest on the claim that surveillance disclosed is surveillance
evaded. Counterterrorism is, after all, a dynamic enterprise. Once
terrorists understand that a particular mode of communication or ac-
tivity evokes surveillance, they are likely to abandon it. But here,
to the Justice Department's implementation and use of the USA PATRIOT ACT."), at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=15327&c=262 (last visited Sept. 30,
2004); ACLU, ACLU Seeks Government Accountability For No-Fly List ("[Tihe government has
refused to confirm the existence of any protocols, procedures or guidelines as to how the 'no
fly' lists were created or to detail how they are being maintained or corrected . . . ."), at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=15422&c=206 (last visited Sept. 30,
2004); Press Release, ACLU, What Is The Matrix? ACLU Seeks Answers on New State-Run Sur-
veillance Program (Oct. 30, 2003) ("The goal of the requests is to find out what information
sources the system is drawing on-information program officials have refused to disclose-as
well as who has access to the database and how it is being used."), http://www.aclu.org/
Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=14257&c=130; Press Release, ACLU, Declassified FBI Documents Sug-
gest Shoddy Management of "No Fly" List, Fail to Show How Innocent Americans Can Get
Names Cleared (Dec. 4, 2003) (describing the "FBI's first-ever release of classified documents
about the controversial 'no fly' terrorist watchlist"), http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/
SafeandFree.cfm?ID=14520&c=272; Electronic Privacy Information Center, Litigation Docket:
Court Cases: FOIA Litigation (describing the cases the EPIC is currently litigating), at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/litigation/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
177 E.g., Doe v. Ashcroft (S.D.N.Y.) (No. 04-2614) (challenging National Security Letter to an
ISP), at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=15543&c=262 (last visited
Sept. 30, 2004); Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin. (challenging No Fly List), at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=15543&c=272 (last visited Sept. 30,
2004); Muslim Cmty. Ass'n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft (E.D. Mich.) (No. 03-72913) (challenging
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act), at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/
SafeandFree.cfm?ID=13255&c=207 (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
"' E.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dept. ofJustice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting
FOIA request seeking information regarding detentions in the aftermath of September 11, the
names of detainees, and their attorneys under the FOIA); ACLU v. Dept. of Justice, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9381 (D.D.C. 2004) (rejecting FOIA request seeking information regarding the use
of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act); ACLU v. Dept. ofJustice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C.
2003) (rejecting FOIA request seeking information regarding the use of surveillance and inves-
tigatory powers).
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there must be some effort to evaluate the actual magnitude of the ef-
fect. The disclosure of the number of "library" searches, for example,
if that number is in fact limited, may assuage the concern of readers
without substantially increasing the tactical advantage of terrorists. It
is here that the possibility of "anonymized" data analysis may come
into its own. To the extent that logs of internal searches can be
"anonymized," they may be disclosed to at least limited public analysis
to examine patterns without substantial fear.
4. Into the Sunset
Of course, the prospect of exposure even to the executive branch
watchdogs or to intelligence oversight committees will have some ef-
fect on security officials. The salutary quality of this effect is likely to
be strengthened if-as should be the case-extraordinary surveil-
lance powers are limited in duration.
More information means more efficient control; yet most of our
social institutions are built on assumption of friction. Moving to fric-
tionless environment destabilizes the checks and balances. If a secu-
rity bureaucrat faces no cost to exploring a citizen's life, while the
failure to explore that life carries a risk of catastrophe, however mar-
ginal, it would be irrational not to investigate, notwithstanding the
fact that each investigation imposes a risk on the person investigated.
One way of addressing this profligacy could be to provide the bu-
reaucrat with a shadow "budget" which would be charged each time
she accessed the details of a citizen's life. 7 9 Notwithstanding the avail-
ability of technology that could accomplish the task of taxing inquir-
ies, this approach is unlikely to find favor in today's environment,
both because the challenge of setting the appropriate level of pay-
ment would be controversial and because the actual technology de-
ployed by security bureaucrats is likely to be primitive. There is, how-
ever, another approach which can capture some of the virtues of
micropayments. If authority to gather or analyze data must be reau-
thorized at regular intervals, a sunsetted authority combined with the
prospect of disclosure to an authorizing agency that is sensitive to the
" In a still more utopian version, one could imagine allowing citizens to set the level of
payment which they were willing to accept for a "peek." Compare Yannis Bakos & Erik Bryn-
jolfsson, Aggregation and Disaggregation of Information Goods: Implications for Bundling, Site Licens-
ing and Micropayment Systems, in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL
INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 117-20 (Brian Kahin & Hal R. Varian eds., 2000),
and A Micropayment for Your Thoughts, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 1, 2003, at http://www.wired.com/
news/ebiz/0,1272,61419,00.html, with RONALD J. MANN & JANE K WINN, ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE 460-61 (2002) (discussing micropayments and noting that micropayment systems
have been developed).
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costs of infringements of civil liberty establishes a "shadow price" for
overusing the authority in question.
This suggestion is not merely hypothetical. As part of its efforts to
make public the scope of potential surveillance, the ACLU obtained a
copy of the FBI guidance for use of the "national security letter" au-
thority granted by the USA PATRIOT Act. The guidance admonishes
its recipients: "In deciding whether or not to re-authorize the broad-
ened authority, Congress will certainly examine the manner in which
the FBI has exercised it.... Supervisors should keep this in mind
when deciding whether or not a particular use of the NSL authority is
appropriate."
CONCLUSION
In today's environment, ex ante judicial control of surveillance is
unlikely. One response lies in strengthening legal doctrines that ex-
ert ex post control against abuse of information obtained by surveil-
lance. The effect of such doctrines, even if courts adopt them, how-
ever, will be sporadic. The most effective constraints lie at the
intersection of technology, politics, and norms. It is precisely those
constraints that underpinned the settlement of the 1970s, and the
challenge for administrators of good will is to find a set of structures
and commitments that will achieve a new settlement that preserves
American liberty.
The task is well described by the office the Army charged with in-
telligence oversight, in its-perhaps prematurely optimistic-
response to the claim that the abuses of the Nixon era are mere "an-
cient history":
When dealing with ... constitutional rights, there is no such thing as
"ancient history." For example, terrorism is on everyone's minds these
days. At one point recently, a senior federal official said publicly that ter-
rorism is so serious that U.S. citizens may well need to give up some of
their rights so they could be properly protected. This is very much like
the thinking that led to the 1960s and 1970s abuses. Had the intelligence
oversight mechanism not been in place, we very well could have seen the
same abuses all over again.181
ISO Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Sec. Law Unit, FBI, National Security Letter Mat-
ters 3 (Nov. 28, 2001), http://www.aclu.org/patriot foia/FOIA/Nov200lFBImemo.pdf.
I18 History, Intelligence Oversight, supra note 38.
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